

**CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
BUDGET AND LEGISLATIVE ANALYST**

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Policy Analysis Report

To: Supervisor Cohen
From: Budget and Legislative Analyst's Office
Re: Violence Prevention in San Francisco
Date: January 13, 2015



Summary of Requested Action

Your office requested that the Budget and Legislative Analyst conduct an analysis of violence prevention programming in San Francisco, including (1) City department budgets and staffing for such programs, (2) funding to community-based organizations, (3) language/ethnic/racial focused programming, (4) trauma mitigation programs, and (5) criminal justice statistics.

The following report provides an examination of the resources allocated to violence prevention programs, the location of such programs, an examination of city planning for violence prevention, and review of performance metrics used for program evaluation.

Executive Summary

The City's budget for violence prevention programs has increased by 23 percent over the past five fiscal years, from \$38.5 million in FY 2010-11 to \$47.3 million in FY 2014-15. Despite this high level of funding, the City does not have a coordinated planning process or efficient way to measure program performance.

In the five year period from FY 2010-11 to FY 2014-15, San Francisco has spent approximately \$208 million on violence prevention programs. More than one-half of this spending is the City's General Fund and Children's Fund.

Nine City departments currently budget for violence prevention programs. The two departments with the largest violence prevention budgets are the Department of Children, Youth and Their Families (DCYF) and the Department of Public Health (DPH), which together comprised \$32.6 million or 68.9 percent of the City's total violence prevention budget in FY 2014-15. The Human Services Agency, District Attorney, and Department on the Status of Women have seen significant increases in their violent prevention budgets from FY 2010-11 to FY 2014-15.

Of the total \$45,058,741 million violence prevention budget in FY 2013-14, the City spends \$31 million or 70 percent of the total funding on programs that target youth and \$15 million or 33 percent of total funding on programs designed to facilitate reentry after incarceration. Violence prevention programs and funding are concentrated in South of Market and the Mission District.

Despite \$47.3 million spent on violence prevention in the current fiscal year, there is no citywide strategic plan to prioritize funding, no needs-assessment process in place to identify citywide gaps in violence prevention programming and no citywide understanding of the effectiveness of violence prevention programs.

The City has five interdepartmental bodies with overlapping membership that meet regularly to plan violence prevention programming, with a focus on youth, reentry, and diversion programs. In addition, the departments of Public Health, Juvenile Probation, and DCYF jointly fund and prioritize youth programs under a *Local Action Plan* to be updated this year. Beyond that, there is no policy planning body that coordinates citywide services for violence prevention or a body that assesses the performance of City departments in preventing violence. Each department defines its own approach to violence prevention and measures its impact differently, at different intervals, and the results are frequently not made public.

The Board of Supervisors needs better information on violence prevention programming in order to effectively appropriate funding.

The Board of Supervisors is under-represented in the violence prevention planning process. The Board of Supervisors participates in only two of the five violence prevention planning bodies. City departments do not regularly report to the Board on the effectiveness of their violence prevention programs nor are the performance data public and available for review. Measurements of program effectiveness are not consistent across City departments nor are they regularly reported to the Board of Supervisors.

The Board of Supervisors has not been briefed on crime in San Francisco since February 2013. Although unemployment in San Francisco began to fall in 2011, violent crime began increasing in 2011 from 677 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants to more than 850 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013. Robberies are the main increase in violent crimes.

The Board should evaluate establishing a citywide advisory and coordinating body for violence prevention programs.

Rather than establishing a sixth interdepartmental violence prevention program coordinating body, the Board should consider how to consolidate the existing five bodies into a citywide advisory and coordinating body that could define performance metrics and report on program performance to the Board of Supervisors, recommend ways to leverage funding among the different departmental programs, and build on City department practices that have been shown to be effective.

As an example, the city of Oakland has a centralized planning and performance review process stemming from a voter-approved special fund dedicated to violence prevention.

Methodology

The Budget and Legislative Analyst surveyed City departments to acquire data on their violence prevention programs. We requested budget data, by source, for FY 2010-11 to 2014-15, contracts with community-based organizations, staffing data, and data on program outcomes. Our office conducted interviews with managers in each City department to discuss the scope of the information request and to come to a common understanding of the types of programs that would be relevant for the report. Our office sought information on any program that aimed to prevent or respond to violence. Because there is no common definition of violence prevention programming, we relied on each department to self-assess which programs constituted violence prevention. Our office then reconciled each department's reporting in cases where multiple departments funded the same program, either through work orders or separate contracts.

Eleven City departments constitute the universe for this report:

- Adult Probation
- City Administrator
- Children, Youth, and Their Families
- District Attorney
- Human Services
- Mayor's Office of Violence Prevention Services
- Police
- Public Defender
- Public Health
- Sheriff
- Status of Women

The Budget and Legislative Analyst also consulted with the Mayor's Office of Economic and Workforce Development (MOEWD), First 5, and the San Francisco Unified School District. In the latter case, the School District was unable to provide comprehensive enough information to be included in this report. First 5 and MOEWD both reported not having any violence prevention programs.

After receiving information, we reviewed the materials for each program and coded attributes such as populations served, service sites, and categories of performance metrics. We asked each department to review and confirm our program coding prior to finalizing our analysis. This coding allowed our office to analyze the geographic distribution of funds within the City and also how funds are distributed across target populations and program design. If a program had multiple service sites, we allocated the total funding evenly to all service sites. The coding also allowed for a citywide comparison of each department's use of performance metrics.

To assess how San Francisco plans its violence prevention programming, the Budget and Legislative Analyst reviewed the following documents:

- *San Francisco Violence Prevention Plan 2008-2013*, Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice
- *Juvenile Justice Local Action Plan 2011*, Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council
- *Performance Audit of Public Safety Realignment*, San Francisco Budget and Legislative Analyst, 2013
- *Realignment in San Francisco: Two Years in Review*, Community Corrections Partnership Executive Committee, 2014
- Supporting legislation from the Board of Supervisors (Files 08-0564, 10-14-80, 11-1050, 12-0143, and 14-0141)
- Meeting minutes of Public Safety Cluster, the Sentencing Commission, the Community Corrections Partnership, the Reentry Council, and the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council

In addition, our office conducted interviews with the Mayor's Office of Violence Prevention Services to gain an understanding of the Interrupt, Predict, and Organize (IPO) mayoral initiative and how it guides citywide violence prevention policy. We also requested information from each reporting department to assess how it defines violence prevention and how the department plans its programming.


The Budget and Legislative Analyst reached out to departmental counterparts in other counties in an effort to develop a comparable set of budget and program data. In particular, we requested information from entities in Los Angeles, Sacramento, Alameda, and Santa Clara counties but did not receive detailed information from these programs. We received more detailed information on Oakland's violence prevention planning, which is summarized in Appendix II.

City Departments' Funding for Violence Prevention Programs

The Citywide budget for violence prevention programs increased by 23 percent, from \$38.5 million in FY 2010-11 to \$47.3 million in FY 2014-15 as shown in Chart 1 below.¹

¹ Budget data includes funding from all sources.

Chart 1: Citywide Funding for Violence Prevention Programs



Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

City General Fund and other City funds made up more than 50 percent of the citywide budget in FY 2013-14, shown in Table 1 below. The Department of Children, Youth and Their Families (DCYF) and the Department of Public Health (DPH) have the largest share of City funds.

Table 1: FY 2013-14 Violence Prevention Funding

	General Fund/ Other Local Funds	Combined Funds	State/ Federal/Other	Total
Adult Probation	\$54,400		\$21,060	\$75,460
City Administrator	\$583,409			\$583,409
DCYF	\$9,793,960		\$5,923,738	\$15,717,698
District Attorney	\$1,253,822		\$548,042	\$1,801,864
Human Services	\$1,955,751		\$352,637	\$2,308,388
Public Defender	\$582,993		\$60,077	\$643,070
Public Health	\$3,240,294	\$10,708,844	\$3,314,608	\$17,401,746
Sheriff	\$1,608,180		\$652,938	\$2,261,118
Status of Women	\$4,403,988			\$4,403,988
Total	\$23,476,796	\$10,708,844	\$10,873,100	\$45,058,741
Percent of Total	52.1%	23.8%	24.1%	100%

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

As shown in Table 2 below, the City Administrator, District Attorney, Human Services, Public Health, and the Status of Women have significantly increased violence programs and funding since FY 2010-11. The City Administrator began to budget for the Community Ambassador Program in FY 2012-13 and then expanded the program in FY 2014-15. The increase in the District Attorney's budget is due primarily to the expansion of the Neighborhood Prosecution program and roll-out of the Alternative Sentencing, Domestic Violence Lethality Project, and the SF

Strong programs. The increase in the Human Services Agency budget is primarily due to the roll out of the Mayor’s Interrupt, Predict, and Organize (IPO) program. The increase in the Department of Public Health’s budget is driven by the increases to the budget for the Crisis Response Team, the San Francisco AIIM program and the roll-out of the Mobile Crisis Team. The AIIM program targets juvenile justice involved youth and the two crisis teams are mental health services for victims and witnesses of violent crime. The increased budget for the Department on the Status of Women is primarily due a \$750,000 supplemental appropriation in FY 2012-13 to provide additional funding for legal services for victims of domestic violence and training for City staff and an increase in funding to shelters for victims of domestic violence.

Two City departments saw decreases to their violence prevention budgets in the five year period from FY 2010-11 to FY 2014-15. DCYF’s violence prevention budget decreased by \$3,069,024, or approximately 17 percent, due to reductions in staffing and the transfer of the Community Response Network (now called the Street Violence Intervention Program or SVIP) to DPH. The Sheriff’s violence prevention budget decreased by \$517,023, or approximately 19 percent, due to five contractors not reapplying for funding.

Table 2: Funding for Violence Prevention Programs, by Department


Department	FY 10-11	FY 11-12	FY 12-13	FY 13-14	FY 14-15	% Change FY 10-11 to 14-15
Adult Probation	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$75,460	\$75,460	
City Administrator	0	0	496,385	583,409	719,684	
DCYF	17,688,757	16,286,339	16,002,232	15,717,698	14,619,733	(17%)
District Attorney	342,170	774,078	1,300,609	1,801,864	1,960,268	473%
Human Services	516,249	508,773	654,131	2,308,388	2,029,071	293%
Public Defender	522,256	540,348	590,013	643,070	655,638	26%
Public Health	13,762,747	14,429,335	14,889,152	17,263,746	20,156,828	46%
Sheriff	2,678,413	2,154,437	2,648,148	2,261,118	2,161,390	(19%)
Status of Women	3,036,343	2,791,158	3,434,722	4,403,988	4,969,207	64%
Total	\$38,546,935	\$37,484,468	\$40,015,392	\$45,058,741	\$47,347,278	23%

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

DCYF, Juvenile Probation, and DPH reported the highest budgeted expenditures for violence prevention programs in FY 2010-11 through FY 2014-15. Together, DCYF’s and DPH’s budgeted expenditures for violence prevention programs in FY 2014-15 were \$32.6 million, or 68.9 percent of citywide budgeted expenditures of \$47.3 million. As shown in Chart 2 below, DCYF’s budgeted expenditures in FY 2014-15 were 14.6 million and DPH’s budgeted expenditures were 20.2 million. The share of DPH, DCYF, and Juvenile Probation’s violence prevention budget


relative to the citywide violence prevention budget has declined over time as other City departments have increased funding for violence prevention. The DCYF/DPH/Juvenile Probation share reached a peak of 81.6 percent of citywide funding in FY 2010-11 and declined to 68.7 percent in FY 2014-15.

Chart 2: Two Largest City Departments' Budgeted Expenditures for Violence Prevention from FY 2010-11 through FY 2013-15



Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

Chart 3: City Departments' Budgeted Expenditures for Violence Prevention from FY 2010-11 through FY 2014-15, excluding DCYF, JUV, and DPH



Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

The violence prevention budgets presented above in Charts 1 - 3 do not account for expenditures by the San Francisco Unified School District and the Police Department, both of which are unable to provide comprehensive budget information. The charts therefore understate the City's total spending on violence prevention.

City Positions Dedicated to Violence Prevention Programs

Table 3 below shows the full-time equivalent (FTE) positions dedicated to managing the City's violence prevention programs. The Mayor's Office of Violence Prevention Services was not created until 2012 and therefore was not staffed until FY 2012-13.² Similarly, the Adult Probation Department did not begin its violence prevention programs until FY 2013-14 and therefore had no staff working on violence prevention until then (aside from routine probation work). The increase in the Administrative Services positions is due to the expansion of the Community Ambassador Program. The increase in the District Attorney's positions is primarily due to the expansion of the Neighborhood Prosecution Program and the roll-out

² The Mayor's Office of Violence Prevention Services did not report budgeted expenditures other than expenditures allocated to the Human Services Agency and Department of Public Health as part of the IPO program.

of the Alternative Sentencing Program. The increase in the Human Services Agency's positions is entirely due to the roll-out of the Mayor's IPO program. Only the Sheriff's Department had a decrease in positions dedicated to violence prevention programs. This was due to the consolidation and expiration of five violence prevention programs.

Table 3: City Department Positions Dedicated to Violence Prevention Programs

Department	FY 10-11	FY 11-12	FY 12-13	FY 13-14	FY 14-15	% Change FY 10-15
Administrative Services	12.00	12.00	22.00	22.00	22.00	83%
DCYF	4.36	4.36	4.36	4.36	4.36	0%
Adult Probation Dept.	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.00	11.00	1100%
Status of Women	5.50	4.50	4.71	5.67	5.74	4%
District Attorney	1.45	3.78	6.27	7.86	6.41	341%
Human Services Agency	0.00	0.00	1.77	1.77	1.77	177%
Public Defender	9.00	9.00	9.00	9.00	10.00	11%
Public Health	34.33	34.33	34.33	34.33	34.33	0%
Sheriff's Dept.	2.35	2.35	2.35	2.09	2.00	-15%
Mayor's Office of Violence Prevention	0.00	0.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	400%
Total	68.99	70.32	88.79	102.08	101.61	47%

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

^a DPH did not provide the total number of positions dedicated to violence prevention programs in FY 2014-15; we assume the same number of positions in FY 2014-15 as in prior years.

Citywide Summary of types of programs

The Budget and Legislative Analyst has identified 164 violence prevention programs spread across 11 City departments over the reporting period. By spending, San Francisco targets the majority (70 percent) of its violence programming towards youth. As shown below in Table 4, 12.7 percent of funding targets limited English speakers, 14.9 percent targets women, 6.6 percent targets LGBT persons, 0.8 percent targets homeless persons, 0.8 percent targets seniors, 0.3 percent targets gangs. The remaining programs are majority reentry programs that target incarcerated persons generally.

Table 4: Violence Prevention Programs by Target Population

Target Population	Youth	Female	Homeless	LGBT	Seniors	Gangs	Race/Ethnicity	Non-English
Funding FY 13-14	\$31,531,060	\$6,698,420	\$340,692	\$2,962,980	\$363,314	\$149,917	\$6,833,346	\$5,727,846
Percent of total (by funding)	70.0%	14.9%	0.8%	6.6%	0.8%	0.3%	15.2%	12.7%

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

^a Percentages do not add to 100% because many programs have several target populations

Violence prevention programming in San Francisco targets a variety of issue areas, as shown in Table 5 below. Reentry and detention-based programming constitute the largest share of violence prevention programming (33.4 percent of total

funds), followed by diversion and secondary prevention programs (23.6 percent of funds).

Table 5: Violence Prevention Programs by Type of Program

Type of Program	Domestic Violence	Reentry / Detention-Based	Diversion / Secondary Prevention	Detention Alternative	Alternative Education	Sex Trafficking / Sexual Assault	Trauma Mitigation	Community Engagement / Provider Training
Funding FY 13-14	\$4,425,884	\$15,062,590	\$10,633,535	\$1,258,514	\$1,248,123	\$719,424	\$4,515,889	\$4,496,757
Percent of total (by funding)	9.8%	33.4%	23.6%	2.8%	2.8%	1.6%	10.0%	10.0%

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments


^a These figures total to less than the overall city budget for violence prevention services in FY 13-14 because \$2.6 million of DCYF and Status of Women funds could not be attributed to any specific program.

Location of the City’s Violence Prevention Programs

The Budget and Legislative Analyst was able to ascertain addresses for 111 of the 160 violence prevention programs operating in FY 13-14 and estimated the location of 36 programs. Map 1 below shows the location and funding of the community-based and city-operated violence prevention programs. Detention-based programs, located in jails in South of Market and juvenile hall south of Twin Peaks, serve incarcerated clients rather than the immediate community.

As shown in the map below, most of the City’s violence prevention programs are located in the South of Market and Mission neighborhoods.

Map 1: Location and funding of violence prevention programs, by Supervisor District



Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

The City's Crime Trends and Unemployment Rate

Increase in Violent Crimes in 2013


Chart 4 below charts the evolution of the violent crime rate, incarceration rate, and unemployment rates in San Francisco.³ It shows the violent crime rate began increasing in 2011 while the unemployment rate began decreasing in 2010. The violent crime rate declined from 853 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 677 per 100,000 inhabitants 2011, but then reverted to 2007 levels by 2013. The

³ Violent Crime rate is per 100,000 inhabitants, reported by the San Francisco Police Department to the California Attorney General. Similarly the statewide incarceration rate is per 100,000 inhabitants, reported by the Department of Justice. Unemployment rates for San Francisco are reported by the U.S. Census' American Community Survey.

unemployment rate peaked in 2010 at 10 percent of the local labor force, but has since fallen to 6 percent in 2013. While the chart shows an apparent inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and the violent crime rate - as unemployment has decreased violent crime has gone up – we did not analyze the correlation between the two.

The state incarceration rate began to decline in 2011, corresponding to the adoption of Assembly Bill (AB) 109, which implemented Public Safety Realignment and the transfer of many lower-level felony offenders from state to county jurisdiction.

Chart 4: Comparison of Violent Crime Rates, Incarceration Rates, and Unemployment Rates in San Francisco from 2007 to 2013



Sources: California Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics; Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics

Robberies are responsible for driving up the crime rate

Table 6 below shows the breakdown of violent crimes in San Francisco from 2011 – 2013, the period during which the overall number of violent crime increased by 31 percent. As shown below, the increase in the violent crime rate is due primarily to an increase in the number of robberies, followed by increases in the number of aggravated assaults and forcible rapes. There were 1,136 more robberies in 2013 when compared to 2011, a 36 percent increase. Robberies account for 67 percent

of the increase in the total number of violent crimes, which increased by 1,699 incidents over the same the period.

The number of murders in San Francisco declined from 69 in 2012 to 48 in 2013, however there were only 4 percent fewer murders in 2013 when compared to 2011.

While the increase in violent crimes coincides with the implementation of Public Safety Realignment, the City does not have data on the number of individuals on community supervision under Public Safety Realignment who have committed violent crimes. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has not released discrete recidivism data for San Francisco since 2010.⁴ The Community Corrections Partnership considered the impact of realignment on crime San Francisco in a report published in January 2014.⁵ The report noted that Realignment clients had recidivism rates significantly lower than the most recent recidivism rate reported for San Francisco by the CDCR. This suggests that the recent uptick in violent is driven by factors other than Realignment.

Table 6: Violent Crimes in San Francisco, 2011 – 2013

Crime	2011	2012	2013	Difference: 2013 vs. 2011	% Change: 2011 - 2013
Homicide	50	69	48	(2)	(4%)
Forcible Rape	134	110	163	29	22%
Robbery	3,142	3,554	4,278	1,136	36%
Aggravated Assault	2,139	2,141	2,675	536	25%
Total Violent Crimes	5,465	5,874	7,164	1,699	31%

Source: California Attorney General, Criminal Justice Statistics Center

San Francisco’s Decrease in the Unemployment Rate

Several concepts must be made clear in discussion of unemployment data. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) conducts surveys across the country to determine national and local employment conditions. The BLS defines *unemployment* as all persons who did not work in the reference week of the survey but were available for work and who self-reported that they made an effort to find a job in the survey period. The *labor force*, a subset of the total population, is the total number of employed and unemployed persons aged 16 and above. The *unemployment rate* is the number of unemployed as a portion of the total labor force (if there 100 people in a city, 45 people working, and 5 people looking for work, then the labor force is 50 and the unemployment rate is 10%). Therefore, measured unemployment can decrease either because a) the number of employed persons increases or b) the labor force decreases. People leave the labor force most commonly because they


⁴ 2010 Adult Institutions Outcome Evaluation Report, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

⁵ Realignment in San Francisco: Two Years in Review, Community Corrections Partnership Executive Committee

die, retire, or give up looking for work. It is for this reason that economists look changes to the labor force and the ratio of employment to total population when using unemployment to assess the health of the economy. Because the population of the country grows every year, the challenge of economic policy is to ensure that job creation outpaces growth in the labor force (which grows as the population grows and with people's willingness to seek work).

Chart 5 below shows the labor force and employment levels in San Francisco. In particular, it shows that the level of employed persons is increasing faster than the growth of the labor force, resulting in a decrease in the city's unemployment. In 2010-2013, the labor force in San Francisco increased by approximately 6%, while the employment level increased by 10%. Unemployment decreased from 9.5% to 5.7% in the same period.


Chart 5: Labor Force and Employment in San Francisco



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics

As shown in Chart 6 below, San Francisco's employments to population ratio rose by 4.6 percentage points or more than 4.5 times the national figure, which rose by less than 1 percentage point in the same period. In other words, the number of employed persons is growing faster than the population. This confirms that San Francisco's unemployment declined due to job creation rather than the decline of the labor force relative to the employment level.

Chart 6: San Francisco Employment – Population Ratio



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey

These statistics do not tell us anything about the distribution of the city's job growth among social groups or whether the job growth is in high or low wage industries.

City Planning for Violence Prevention

San Francisco has five interdepartmental bodies that meet regularly to coordinate programs to reduce recidivism and violence in the City. Four of these bodies are established in the City's Administrative Code or in State law. The Reentry Council and Community Corrections Partnership manage the reentry of ex-offenders, the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council focuses on at-risk youth, and the Sentencing Commission focuses on alternatives to incarceration for adult offenders. The fifth body is an ad hoc committee, the Public Safety Cluster, created by the Mayor in 2012 to implement the Mayor's Interrupt, Predict, and Organize for a Safer San Francisco (IPO) initiative, discussed further below.

The Reentry Council, Sentencing Commission and Community Corrections Partnership share similar purposes in serving adults out of custody and have overlapping membership, as shown in Table 7 below. The Budget and Legislative Analyst recommended integration of the functions of the Reentry Council and Sentencing Commission with the State-mandated Community Corrections Partnership in the February 2013 *Performance Audit of San Francisco's Implementation of Public Safety Realignment* in order to streamline program planning and coordination, but the recommendation was not implemented.

Subsequently, the Mayor's Office created the Public Safety Cluster in 2012, which has similar membership to the other four bodies but is responsible for specific programs making up the IPO.

Mandated Coordinating Bodies

Reentry Council

The Reentry Council was created by the Board of Supervisors in 2008 (File 08-0564), amended in 2011 (File 10-1480) and reauthorized in 2014 (File 14-0141). The purpose of the Reentry Council is to coordinate the reentry of adults and juveniles returning from San Francisco County Jail, San Francisco juvenile justice out-of-home placements, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation facilities, and the United States Federal Bureau of Prison facilities. The legislation that established the Reentry Council emphasizes its role in coordinating local efforts and providing comprehensive information about reentry programs and barriers to successful reentry. Membership includes City departments, a victim of violent crime, and a representative from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council (JJCC)

The Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council (JJCC) was established pursuant to Section 749.22 of Article 18.7 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code as a necessary component under the State of California's Juvenile Crime Enforcement and Accountability Challenge Grant Program. To receive funding, each county is required to establish a multi-agency council to develop and implement a continuum of county-based responses to juvenile crime. Membership includes City departments and representatives from community-based organizations.

Sentencing Commission

The Board of Supervisors established the Sentencing Commission in 2012 (File 11-1050). The purpose of the Commission is to analyze sentencing patterns and outcomes, and to make recommendations to the Board, Mayor, and City departments on sentencing reforms that advance public safety and reduce recidivism, including alternatives to incarceration and other evidenced-based strategies. Membership includes City departments, representatives of community-based organizations, and an academic expert.

Community Corrections Partnership (CCP)

Community Corrections Partnerships were established in each county in California by California Penal Code 1203. The purpose of the Partnership was to advise the county's probation on the implementation of programs to reduce recidivism funded by state funds from SB678. In 2011, The California Public Safety Realignment Act (AB109 & AB 117) established the Executive Committee of the Community Corrections Partnership (CCPEC) to make recommendations to the Board of Supervisors on the implementation of the county's Realignment plan. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors approved the CCPEC's plan on September 29, 2011.

Mayor's Office of Violence Prevention Services

Public Safety Cluster

The Public Safety Cluster is a group City departments that is convened by the Mayor's Director of Violence Prevention. The Cluster was established in 2012 to serve as a single point of contact and to oversee all work associated with violence prevention programming of the Interrupt, Predict, and Organize for a Safer San Francisco (IPO), discussed below. The Police, Adult Probation and Juvenile Probation Departments are represented, but currently the Sheriff and Public Defender are not. The Cluster currently meets bimonthly to discuss trends in crime in San Francisco and coordinate City services among law enforcement and social service providers. The group will begin meeting monthly starting in 2015. Membership is currently limited to City departments.

The membership and meeting frequency of the Reentry Council, Public Safety Cluster, Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council, Sentencing Commission, and the Community Corrections Partnership is summarized in Table 7 below.⁶

⁶ In addition to the aforementioned planning bodies, the Family Violence Council advises policy on programming related to family violence.

Table 7: Violence Prevention Coordinating Bodies, Membership

Department	Reentry Council	JJCC	Sentencing Commission	Community Corrections Partnership	Public Safety Cluster
Authority	Administrative Code Sec. 5.1-1	State Welfare and Institutions Code Sec. 749.22	Administrative Code Section 5.250	State Penal Code Sec. 1230	Ad Hoc
Meeting Frequency	3x per year	Annual	3x per year	Approx. 4 x per year	Bimonthly (monthly in 2015)
Adult Probation	X	X	X	X	X
Board of Supervisors	X	X			
City Administrator					
DCYF	X	X			X
District Attorney	X	X	X	X	X
Human Services Agency	X	X		X	
Juvenile Probation	X	X	X		X
Mayor's Office of Housing		X			X
Housing Authority					X
Office of Violence Prevention		X			X
Workforce and Economic Development	X	X		X	
Police	X	X	X	X	X
Public Defender	X		X	X	
Public Health	X	X	X	X	X
Superior Court	X	X	X	X	
Unified School District or education representative		X		X	X
Sheriff	X	X	X	X	
Status of Women					X
Recreation and Parks					X
Child Support Services	X				X
Public Works					X
CA Dept. Corrections and Rehab.	X				
US Probation & Pretrial Services	X				
Community Representative	- Seven formerly incarcerated members, of one whom identifies as a survivor of violence or crime	- Community Representative - Drug & Alcohol Prevention Org. - Juvenile Advisory Cmte. - Juv. Justice Providers Assoc.	- Member of a CBO chosen by Reentry Council - Member of a CBO chosen by Family Violence Council - Sentencing Expert - Academic	- Reentry CBO - Domestic violence CBO - Five Keys Charter School	-Street Violence Intervention Program (SVIP)


Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst

The Local Action Plan

The Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council developed a citywide plan in 2011 to coordinate the services and funding of DCYF, DPH, and Juvenile Probation violence prevention programming aimed at youth ages 10 to 25. DCYF undertook an intensive solicitation of community input, including meetings with community-based organizations, neighborhood meetings, focus groups with juvenile justice stakeholders, and interviews with relevant city officials. The Board of Supervisors approved the resulting Local Action Plan in 2012 (File 12-0143). Chart 7 below shows the “Circle of Care” model the *Local Action Plan* uses to outline a set of services that can help youth avoid or exit the criminal justice system. The *Local Action Plan* presents six strategies to be deployed around the “Circle of Care”: (1) alternative education, (2) secondary prevention, (3) diversion, (4) detention alternative, (5) detention-based services, and (6) aftercare/reentry.

The JJCC will revise the *Local Action Plan* in 2015 and submit it to the Board of Supervisors for approval.

Chart 7: Circle of Care



Source: DCYF

The Mayor’s Office and Interrupt, Predict, and Organize (IPO)

In 2012 Mayor Lee announced the *Interrupt, Predict, and Organize* (IPO) initiative to reduce violent crime. IPO establishes the path to reducing violence and relies on the relevant City departments to implement the goals. Chart 8 below summarizes the goals of the IPO initiative.

Chart 8: Interrupt, Predict, and Organize

	Interrupt	Predict	Organize
Tools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encourage collaboration of law enforcement to stop violence in Hot Zones - Deploy street outreach teams to Hot Zones (SVIP) and after violent crime (SVRT) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SFPD use crime mapping & crime statistics to deploy resources - SFPD use real-time data to deploy resources - ADP use COMPAS to identify recidivism risk factors and plan intervention 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deploy community teams to Hot Zones after a violent crime and ensure victims receive city services (SVRT) - Hold meetings in neighborhoods to acquire community input - Facilitate Public Safety Cluster meetings - Organize gun buybacks with SFPD and CBOs

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst interviews with Mayor’s Office of Violence Prevention Services

To implement IPO, the Mayor’s Office of Violence Prevention Services was established in 2012. The Office operates as a coordinating body to ensure local stakeholders are communicating, sharing resources, and are held accountable for direct community-based interventions. The Office coordinates the Public Safety Cluster meetings, described above. It also convenes the Street Violence Response Team (SVRT), a city department, community- and faith-based series of meetings activated 48 hours after a violent incident. The purpose of these meetings is to ensure all victims, witnesses, and perpetrators are receiving the full spectrum of City services, including law enforcement, legal support, mental health, case management, victim compensation and financial support.

The Mayor’s Office of Violence Prevention Services allocates funds to the Department of Public Health to implement the Street Violence Intervention Program (SVIP), a street outreach program that connects at-risk youth and victims of violent crime with social services. SVIP operates in Hot Zones in the Mission/Excelsior, Western Addition, Bayview, and Visitacion Valley neighborhoods. The SVIP also rely on multiple referral sources and secondary prevention services to engage youth and young adults ages 10-30 years olds that are identified as victims and/or perpetrators of street violence. The program is designed to improve identified high at-risk and in-risk individuals’ employability, earnings and establish long-term success in unsubsidized employment positions, as well as reduce recidivism. The Office also allocates funds to the Human Services

Agency to implement an employment program in which at-risk youth receive vocational training and work experience as employees at the Department of Public Works.

Oakland has centralized planning for violence prevention

The City of Oakland has an alternative funding model that generates mandatory spending on violence prevention through Measure Y, a voter-approved tax that funds public safety services and community-based organizations that operate violence prevention programs. Oakland's single funding source helps service coordination and redirection, particularly in regard to identifying and filling service gaps by public entities. In addition, the funding provides for annual program evaluation to assess each program's impact on violence prevention, with standardized metrics and evaluation intervals for all community-based organizations that receive funding. A description of the strengths and weaknesses of Oakland's violence prevention planning process can be found in Appendix II.

Measuring Program Effectiveness

Defining success

There is no standard definition of what constitutes violence prevention and therefore no standard definition of successful violence prevention. For the purposes of this report, the Budget and Legislative Analyst relied on each department's self-assessment of which programs it considered violence prevention and each department's self-reported assessment of its programming. The description of each department's approach to violence prevention is described in the department-level analysis above.

The Budget and Legislative Analyst (1) examined the extent to which departments are measuring program effectiveness, (2) examined the different kinds of performance metrics used by City departments, and (3) makes recommendations on how to improve performance measurement Citywide.

San Francisco's use of performance metrics

Table 8 summarizes City departments' use of performance metrics. As shown below, 122 of the 164 programs or 74.4 percent of the programs under review track either recidivism or some other outcome metric. Of the programs that track recidivism, at least 89 percent of them also track other metrics that are specifically linked to the program's goals. Of the 26 programs that do not track performance, 13 are Police programs, 8 are Sheriff programs, 4 are Status of Women programs, and 1 program is at the Human Services Agency. Performance in this case is defined as a measurement of an impact attributable to the program. Simply tracking the number of clients served would not count as a performance metric, unless the program is a provider training.

Table 8 San Francisco’s Use of Performance Metrics

Performance Metrics	Recidivism	Not Recidivism, but Other Metric	Unknown If Tracking Metrics	No Metrics Tracked
Count	73	49	14	26
Percent of total	44.5%	29.9%	8.5%	15.9%

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

Although recidivism and other measures of program success are regularly collected by City departments, their use in public and official decision making is limited. Except for DCYF and Adult Probation, city departments generally do not publish the performance data of their violence prevention programming and/or do so intermittently. Table 9 below summarizes the extent to which City departments collect and publish performance data for their violence prevention programming.

Table 9: Performance Data

Department	Performance Data: Public	Performance Data: At least 1x/year
Adult Probation	Yes	Yes
City Administrator	No	Yes
DCYF	Yes	Yes
District Attorney	No	Yes
Human Services	No	Yes
Mayor's Office	No	Yes
Police	No	No
Public Defender	No	No
Public Health	No	Yes
Sheriff	No	Yes
Status of Women	Yes	Yes

Source: Budget and Legislative Analyst Survey of City Departments

The Budget Legislative Analyst reviewed contracts between City departments and community-based organizations. In no case was recidivism or other performance metrics cause to terminate the contract.

In summary, more than three-quarters of violence prevention programs collect performance metrics. However, aside from recidivism, these measures of performance are not standardized across departments and while they may technically be publicly available, they are not easily accessible for public review.

Recidivism in San Francisco

Recidivism is the rate at which individuals have further contact with the criminal justice system within a given period of time. Typically, recidivism rates refer to the

individuals return to custody within three years after serving time in a juvenile hall, jail, or prison. The definition can be adjusted for different period and events, such as being arrested.

As noted above, recidivism is a standard performance metric collected by the majority of San Francisco’s violence prevention programs. There are several benefits of using recidivism to measure program performance. Because client arrests and incarcerations are automatically kept by the pre-existing criminal justice databases in City departments, recidivism data is theoretically easy to collect. To the extent it captures recurrence of violence, recidivism is a direct measure of violence prevention. Table 10 below presents recidivism rates for San Francisco. Note that these data captures the entire adult probation population, whether or not they were served by the violence prevention programming under review and whether or they returned to custody because of a technical parole violation or new offence.

Table 10: Probation Success in San Francisco

San Francisco Adult Probation Department Felony Probationer State Prison and County Jail (1170h) Revocations 2009 - 2013						
	Total Probation Population	% Change in Probation Population Since 2009	Revoked & Sentenced to State Prison	% Change in Prison Revocations Since 2009	Revoked & Sentenced to State Prison or County Jail/1170h	% State Prison and County Jail/1170h Revocations Since 2009
2009	6,800		256	0%	256	0%
2010	6,388	-6%	199	-22%	199	-22%
2011	6,133	-4%	133	-48%	133	-48%
2012	5,696	-7%	65	-75%	156	-39%
2013	5,054	-11%	44	-83%	102	-60%

Source: Adult Probation Department

As shown in Table 10 above, the number of individuals on probation who returned to custody while on probation declined from 2009 to 2013. However, the variation in original offences, probation sentences, and reasons for probation revocation may obscure the extent to which the data in Table 10 is a true measure of success for violence prevention programming.

A more formal definition of recidivism used by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is the number of persons returned to state custody out of the total number paroled within a given period of time. According to CDCR data, San Francisco has a recidivism rate higher than the statewide average, and significantly higher than the county with the lowest recidivism rate, Los Angeles. This data includes all offences and only captures individuals in state custody. In 2010, the most recent year for which San Francisco data is available, 78.3 percent of offenders recidivated and were returned to CDCR custody within

three years, compared to the statewide average of 67.5 percent.⁷ In 2013, the CDCR reported that a group of counties, which includes San Francisco, had an average three-year recidivism rate of 65.2 percent, compared to a statewide rate of 61 percent. In 2013, the lowest three-year recidivism rate was 50.4 percent in Los Angeles County.⁸

Limits to using recidivism as a performance metric

There are several problems with using recidivism as a performance metric. Most obviously, using re-incarceration data does not capture first time offenders. Therefore, secondary prevention programs need to adjust the definition of recidivism so that it captures whether a client goes to jail within a given time period after completing the prevention program.

Depending on how it is defined recidivism rates capture the extent to which an individual or group has further contact with the criminal justice system. However, even the best programming sometimes cannot overcome individual factors such as family support, mental health needs, and the extent to which individuals have other service requirements. Individuals with severe and multiple needs may therefore recidivate despite effective programming. Recidivism rates only capture whether an individual has been re-arrested or incarcerated over a given period time, not the frequency of such incidents over time. For individuals with the severest needs, reduction in recidivism frequency may be the best measure of performance.

Factors exogenous to violence prevention programming may bias the recidivism rate. Changes in demographics (particularly age), the health of the economy, changes to police enforcement practices and sentence duration, legal changes to what constitutes a criminal violation, and the extent to which correctional institutions succeed in rehabilitation, all influence an individual's propensity to recidivate. These larger societal changes may not correspond with the performance of violence prevention programming. Therefore, recidivism may rise or fall independent of the quality of violence prevention programming.

The accuracy of recidivism rates in measuring violence prevention depends on the effectiveness of law enforcement and the extent to which groups are targeted for monitoring by law enforcement. By definition, recidivism rates only capture when an individual has contact with the criminal justice system. Certain crimes, social groups, and neighborhoods are more likely to be monitored by law enforcement and are thus more likely to be captured in the official recidivism rate. However, a crime may still occur without the offender being captured. In short, official recidivism rates may differ from the true amount of violence prevented.

In light of this, there are two issues specific to using recidivism as a performance metric for violence prevention programming: (1) By only relying on recidivism, policy makers may create a selection bias among program managers and grantees

⁷ 2010 CDCR Adult Institutions Outcome Evaluation Report

⁸ 2013 CDCR Adult Institutions Outcome Evaluation Report

to only treat low-risk individuals in order to keep their program's recidivism rate low enough to maintain funding and (2) Recidivism only demonstrates that a program has potentially failed, but not why.

Other performance metrics

Due to the incompleteness of recidivism as a performance metric, City departments collect other program data in lieu of or to supplement recidivism data. City departments and community-based organizations survey clients' self-assessed wellbeing pre- and post-program, client satisfaction with programming, and the extent to which clients achieve program goals (such as acquiring a job or permanent housing). Additionally, DCYF collects data on the risks its clients are facing (e.g. previous foster placement, parent in/has been in jail) to ensure it is serving youth with the highest needs.

While these other metrics are useful to assess program outcomes, their heterogeneity makes it difficult for them to be applied Citywide. As mentioned above, program performance across city departments is measured at different intervals and infrequently published. DCYF standardizes performance measurement of among the subsets of its programming, so that, for example, all detention-based programs use the same metrics and all diversion programs use the same metrics (but different than the detention-based ones). However, there is no such standardized definition of success for among City departments that provide similar kinds of services. For example, Adult Probation and DCYF both fund re-entry programs but measure their impact differently, at different intervals, and in separate databases.

Conclusion

Ten City departments, not including the Police Department, provide violence prevention programs. Funding for City departments' violence prevention programs has increased by 23 percent over the past five fiscal years, from \$38.5 million in FY 2010-11 to \$47.3 million in FY 2014-15. More than one-half of this funding is City General Fund and other local funds. Despite this high level of programming and funding, the City does not have a coordinated planning process or efficient way to measure program performance. There are currently five different interdepartmental bodies responsible for violence prevention programming with overlapping membership.

The City has no standard definition of what constitutes violence prevention and therefore, no standard definition of successful violence prevention programs. While most City department programs have some form of performance metric, these measures of performance apart from recidivism are not standardized across departments and are not easily accessible for public review. Oakland offers an alternative funding and planning model in which citywide violence prevention services are coordinated and evaluated on an annual basis.

The Board of Supervisors needs better information when appropriating funds to violence prevention programs, and needs to know that these programs are

effective. The Board should evaluate establishing a citywide advisory and coordinating body for violence prevention programs. Rather than establishing a sixth body, the Board should consider how to consolidate the existing five bodies into a citywide advisory and coordinating body that could define performance metrics and report on program performance to the Board of Supervisors, and recommend ways to leverage funding among the different departmental programs.