Section 2.1: Operations Division Reorganization
The Operations Division of the Department consists of three (3) Divisions, ten (10) Battalions, 42 engine companies, 19 aerial truck companies, 20 medic units, two (2) heavy rescue units, two (2) fireboats, other specialty service units and the San Francisco International Airport Division. The Department provides emergency fire and medical services to over 1.5 million people that includes 800,000 residents, over 450,000 daily commuters, an undetermined amount of tourists, and the residents and visitors to Treasure Island and the San Francisco International Airport.
The City of San Francisco is known worldwide for its beauty and charm. The same reasons why San Francisco is so attractive to residents and tourists alike makes it one of the most difficult cities to protect from fire, natural and manmade disasters. The Department has a long and rich tradition of protecting our City and its residents, and throughout its history has had to contend with unique topography, unprecedented density, combustible and attached construction, population shifts, life hazards, traffic patterns, narrow street, and profound natural barriers (Golden Gate Park, Twin Peaks, McClaren Park, Telegraph Hill, Mt. Sutro, and Mt. Davidson).
The City"s geography and construction, while making it one of the most picturesque cities in the world, adds to the challenge of protecting it. High rise buildings, hills and canyons create violent and unpredictable wind characteristics. Narrow streets, above ground electrical wiring and housing set-backs can make laddering structures almost impossible and can require ladders to be hand carried for blocks.
Comparison of San Francisco to other Cities
The Budget Analyst has made a number recommendations based on surveys and visits to other fire departments. The Department believes that San Francisco"s unique geography, density, and age, limit its comparability to other cities in our Nation.
San Francisco is in many respects singularly unique as a City in this nation. The City was designed prior to the turn of the 19th century, so it most resembles cities on the East Coast of the United States; with wall to wall construction, numerous one-way streets, and zero set back lots. But because of San Francisco"s proximity to the Sierra Nevada mountain range, highly combustible redwood became the primary construction material, as opposed to the stone and masonry construction seen in the urban landscape of the Midwest and East Coast.
A continuous string of large conflagrations culminating in the earthquake of 1906 required the city to construct the only dedicated auxiliary water supply system in the nation. This water was designed to provide a dedicated flexible and inexhaustible source of water for fire suppression and is a fundamental element in the defense of the City in times of earthquake or disaster.
Unlike other cites, San Francisco is unable to rely on mutual aid from neighboring jurisdictions. San Francisco"s location on a peninsula (surrounded on threesides byeither the Pacific Ocean or the bay) reduces access to the City by surrounding fire departments and if the fragile network of bridges were to be compromised, would all but eliminate ingress and egress.It is worth remembering thatthe scope of a disaster that would trigger the use of mutual aid would in probability be so large that neighboring departments would be preoccupied with providing service to their own comminutes and be unavailable to the City.
The Department"s response to the audit will show that San Francisco cannot be compared with cities like Sacramento, San Jose or Los Angeles. While the auditors attempt to draw analogies to other departments, they do not share the workloads, or the daily responsibilities and duties of division and battalions chiefs in those cities.
The Auditor has chosen to compare the staffing used by the San Francisco Fire Department to Los Angeles, Oakland, Sacramento, Long Beach, Fresno, San Diego and San Jose. San Francisco"s unique geography, coupled with severe density makes these comparisons spurious. These other California cities all have relatively flat topography, detached homes, sprawling boundaries, are often surrounded by well populated suburbs that provide mutual aid, and have more modern construction and infrastructure than San Francisco. In fact the only cities with comparable density are Boston, Chicago and Philadelphia. It is the density factor, coupled with the combustibility of building material and balloon construction1 used before the mid century that drives the Department"s assignment rules (the number of resources dispatched to an incident type). Navigating old, narrow and congested surface streets, the lack of express and freeways, and natural barriers that force circuitous routes, all contribute to the complexity of emergency response in San Francisco.
Exhibit 2.1.1 compares the density of San Francisco with other California cities cited by the Auditor
Exhibit 2.1.2 compares the density of San Francisco with other major cites nationwide.
Exhibit 2.1.1: Density Comparison of other California Cities
Exhibit 2.1.2: Density Comparison of other major Cities
It is this density and unique combination of construction and materials that requires the
San Francisco Fire Department to respond to a large number of greater alarm fires every year. While stone and masonry construction and detached housing allow other cities to contain most fires to the single alarm level, in San Francisco fire spreads quickly, and can hide effectively. Exhibit 2.1.3 compares the number of greater alarm fires in San Francisco to other major cities in the nation and Exhibit 2.1.4 compares the number of greater alarm fires in San Francisco to other communities in California.
Exhibit 2.1.3 Greater Alarm Fires in Major American Cities
Exhibit 2.1.4: Greater Alarms in Calif. Cities
The Audit refers to the lack of data available on the command structure of other major Fire Departments in the country2. Exhibit 2.1.5 illustrates the population, relative density, first alarm complement, number of Battalion Chiefs and Division Chiefs available in the jurisdiction as well as the number of greater alarms per pear. The greater the number of large fires, the more critical the need for command staff to quickly activate a command post, and begin directing operations as incident commander to reduce loss if life and property, and assure fireground safety for uniform members. It is clear that while other jurisdictions may have larger populations, San Francisco"s unique physical characteristics incite far greater alarms.
*Note: E= Engine, T=Truck, RS= Rescue Squad, SC= Safety Chief Officer, CU= Communications Unit, BC= Battalion Chief, DC= District Chief ( Equivalent to San Francisco Fire Department Battalion Chief)
The danger in understaffing the operational complement detailed to a working fire in San Francisco with all its unique characteristics, is the potential for a dramatic increase in the loss of life and property. The idea of COMMAND AND CONTROL is a fundamental underpinning of successful fire department operations. The ability to quickly establish a command post and allow tactical decisions to be made by a chief officer serving as incident commander in the command post, is a critical link in reducing the mortality and morbidity of civilians and firefighters, reducing property loss and increasing fireground safety. The value of a Chief officers" experience, and their ability to remain mobile at incidents to survey large areas and coordinate all potential risk factors (i.e. aggressive attack, fire conditions, fire spread, and safety conditions) cannot be underestimated. A Company officer cannot leave his/her unit to perform this critical function. To do so would leave the company without radio communications and represents a serious violation of standard fireground safety practices that require firefighters to operate in two person teams at a minimum3 (buddy system.)
The population shift in San Francisco is as dramatic as any city in the nation. Each business day the City hosts over 450,000 daily commuters. While a large percentage find their way to the financial district, commuters staff workplaces all over the City. The recent and rapid increase in office space has caused a proportional increase in the infrastructure to support them. The South of Market and Mission Bay areas are just two San Francisco neighborhoods that have seen enormous growth in the last decade.
San Francisco is also home to one of the largest transient and indigent populations in the Country. Numerous services for the homeless including shelters and social services, and a mild climate make San Francisco a destination city for many homeless. While their number is difficult to estimate and relatively small (10 to 15 thousand), this single group represents a significant percentage of the Department"s medical and fire calls for service.
San Francisco is also home to one of the oldest (age) average populations in the country. The average age of a San Francisco resident is 36.5 yrs, in comparison to the average age of a resident of Los Angeles (31.6) or Philadelphia (32.2). As the population of a city ages, the need for additional emergency medical resources increases. The population of San Francisco has grown to rely on the Department for the highest quality of emergency medical services.
Expanding role of the Fire Service
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has clearly shown that fire departments nationally are steadily increasing their response to non-fire emergencies. Exhibit 2.1.3 is the Personnel Utilization chart for the San Francisco Fire Department. This chart illustrates that while the number of on-duty firefighters has dropped from a 535 in 1966-67 to 354 today, the personnel utilization has increased from 44.68 in 1966-67 to 309.175 today. Moreover, the addition of the emergency medical function in 1997 has further increased the role of the Department in its service to the community.
Exhibit 2.1.4 illustrates that while the number of fires may have decreased minimally, the individual workload per firefighter has increased by 734% since 1966-67. The Fire Department now responds to all calls for medical assistance, the San Francisco International Airport (SFO), Hazardous Materials Incidents, surf rescues, cliff rescues, bay rescues, OES mutual aid, incidents at BART and MUNI, well being checks, routine fire inspections, school drills, community events, Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS - City response to weapons of mass destruction), and all public safety measures expect for police services. The Department has been asked to assume these responsibilities while experiencing reductions in the number of uniformed members available to provide these services.
Exhibit 2.1.6 Daily Staffing level v. Personnel Utilization
Note: On Exhibit 2.1.7: FY 1999-2000 figure represents CAD / fire data for July 1, 1999 through April 12, 2000 (E911 cutover).
Exhibit: 2.1.7 Individual Workload Statistics Fiscal Years 1965-66 through 1999-00
Analysis of Audit Methodology
The Budget Analyst has also used workload analysis, unit utilization statistics, review of the Incident Command System (ICS) manual and projected salary savings from deleted positions to develop recommendations. After careful review, the Department believes that much of the data proffered by the Auditor for critical recommendations were factually incorrect and materially underestimates the amount of service provided by the Department to the residents and visitors of San Francisco. The Budget Analyst fails to acknowledge those duties provided by Division and Battalion Chiefs not "captured" in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. These duties and responsibilities represent critical functions ranging from overseeing and participating in drills and training to administrative oversight.
Additionally, the Auditor"s understanding and interpretation of the ICS is not accurate. Certain functions of the ICS can only be accomplished with an experienced chief officer who has the ability to remain mobile and maintains an overarching perspective on the incident. Managing more than three to five units on an emergency incident creates an unsafe environment and is direct violation of NFPA standards regarding span of control. To ask company officers to provide these functions is a clear breech of safety standards.
The Department reviewed the salary figures used by the auditor and cannot substantiate the figures. In the review of the Department"s salary figures presented in the audit as compared to the actual 2000-01 salaries and benefits, the auditor overstates the salaries for uniform positions as follows:
The Budget Analyst"s report also refers to a "top step" salary in figures presented for many uniform classifications. This statement is misleading. There are only two classifications have steps in the salary, H2 Firefighter and H1 Paramedic. All other uniform fire classifications are compensated using a flat rate salary amount that is outlined in the City"s Compensation Manual compiled by the Department of Human Resources.
The Department welcomes the opportunity to participate in analysis that may lead to additional effectiveness, however our focus remains on enhancing readiness and increasing the level and quality of service delivered to the residents and visitors of San Francisco. Any direction for change based solely on economics that would reduce or jeopardize the Department"s state of readiness runs in opposition to our mission.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
The Fire Commission should:
2.1.1 Conduct an analysis of the Department"s command structure, as discussed in this report.
· Assessment of Department
The Department concurs with recommendation of the audit
The Department will conduct this analysis as an element of the development of a strategic five (5) year plan. The Department is currently in the process of developing this plan. A critical element of this strategic plan will be the proposal of a formal reorganization. This reorganization will reflect modern management techniques, optimization of personnel and staff, recognition of the growing role of EMS in our Department, the need for better interdepartmental cooperation, and the need for strong fiscal management. The Department expects that this reorganization may result in some redeployment of the resources focused on by the Auditor. The new organization will represent the shape of the Department as determined by operational goals and requirements and should be completed by December 2002. This timeline will allow the strategic plan be used for preparation of the FY 2003-2004 budget.
The Department intends to focus on operational efficiency and increasing the quality and level of service provided to the residents and visitors to the San Francisco. Any direction for change based solely on economics that would reduce or jeopardize the Department"s state of readiness runs in opposition to the core mission of the Department.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.2 Reduce the number of Fire Suppression Divisions by one, from three to two, each commanded by a 40-hour workweek Division Commander
· Assessment of Department
The Department disagrees with the recommendation of the audit.
A reduction in the number of Division Commanders and their subsequent transition to a 40 hour work week would significantly impair effective Department operations. The current structure of three Division chiefs on duty 24 hours a day provides critical operational and administrative support for the Department. The Division Chiefs currently oversee operations on the scene of working fires, multi-causality incidents, disaster operations and hazardous materials incidents. Additionally they provide significant administrative support to the Department and act as the direct extension of the Deputy Chief of Operations in the field.
The Auditor states that "healthy competition between the two divisions" may be one of the possible advantages of two 40 hour/week division commanders. The idea of competition, whether healthy or otherwise runs contrary to the tenants of effective fire department operations. A Fire Department is only as successful as the teamwork, cooperation and Esprit de Corps instilled in its uniform force. Even healthy competition can have the unfortunate tendency to fragment and divide cohesive work units.
Another possible advantage according to the auditor may be "enhanced control of sick pay, time coming, and trades." While a division commander may periodically see summary reports concerning the use of elective leave, the initial monitoring and control must occur in the workplace, in this case at the fire station with the company officer. It is difficult to envision a scenario where a division commander would be able to effectively supervise the over 700 Department personnel that would be transferred to his / her command under the two-division commander model recommended by the auditor.
The Auditor refers to the possibility of "more consistent enforcement of disciplinary standards" The addition of the two 40 hour / week Division commanders does not change the fact that accountability and responsibility for discipline rests with the company officer. The questions of enforcement and compliance are handled through the normal chain of command, a founding tenant of any paramilitary organization.
Commanders in the field are an integral part of Department operations, and their presence is required on a 24 / 7 basis. The transition to an 8 hours a day / 40 hour week would only further remove them from the personnel in their charge.
The auditor recommends that Chief of Department (CD1) and Deputy Chief Operations (CD2) provide support to operations and respond to major fires or disasters and assume operational control. In the current City Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) CD1 and CD2 are required to respond to the Emergency Operations Center and assume leadership roles in policy and incident command teams for the City. The EOP also requires Deputy Chief Administration (CD3) to respond to the Fire / EMS Communication Center located at the CECC, to oversee fire suppression and emergency activities. Under disaster conditions, they are not available to take field command of any incident.
The budget analyst uses "unit utilization time" based only on service hours captured by the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system as justification for the recommendation in the reduction of Division supervisors. Unit utilization can be a misleading statistic when referred to independently of the other required responsibilities of these Division supervisors. The duties of a field Division chief in the Department include but are not limited to:
· Provides command and control activities at all emergencies
· Administrate the their division in conformity with the rules and regulations
· Responsible for the general condition, the discipline and the efficiency of the divisions under their charge
· Inspect each station in their district and carefully inspect personnel journals, apparatus, records, equipment, and general conditions of the stations
· Hold daily conferences with the on-duty Battalion Chiefs
· Examine all reports and communications originating in their divisions
· Respond to accidents involving Department vehicles in their division when injuries are involved
· Develop a thorough knowledge of the physical conditions throughout their division that include structural conditions of buildings, extraordinary hazards, locations and function of fire suppression systems, water supplies available for fire extinguishment and auxiliary fire alarm systems
· Regularly inspect buildings in their division
· At the beginning of each shift, ascertain the numerical strength of their division and balance their division in cooperation with the Bureau of Assignment and their Battalion Chiefs
· Attending Community meetings including those sponsored by the San Francisco Police Department
· Attend daily Command staff meetings with the Deputy Chief of Operations
· In collaboration with Chief of Department and both Deputies develops Department General Orders
The administrative duties represent a full eight hour day of service not captured by the CAD, and often many more hours depending on emergency activities and night time community meetings. It is also important to note that 2/3 of all greater alarms are reported to the Department after ordinary business hours. If the auditor"s recommendation were implemented, only one Division chief would be available for all incidents in the City and County after regular business hours. This configuration could lead to excessive response times, leading to a potentially serious compromise of the incident command system and fireground safety procedures.
While the Department is in disagreement with this recommendation of the Auditor, the Department, as part of the five (5) year strategic plan, will perform a work flow analysis regarding the deployment and appropriate use of Division and Battalions in the Department.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.3 Request adequate staff each of the two Divisions to provide the planning, coordinating, directing, and controlling required to effectively deploy the Divisions.
· Assessment of Department
The Department disagrees with the recommendation of the audit.
This recommendation is linked to the development of the two 40 hr / week Division Commanders. As such, this will be addressed as part of the Five (5) year strategic plan.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.4 Replace the three 24-hour Division Chiefs with a single Watch Commander.
· Assessment of Department
The Department disagrees with the recommendation of the audit.
This recommendation is linked to the development of the two 40 hr / week Division Commanders. As such, this will be addressed as part of the Five (5) year strategic plan.
It should be noted that a single Watch Commander (Division Chief) would be responsible for responding to all simultaneous fires, greater alarms, multi-casualty incidents (MCI), cliff rescues, water rescues, San Francisco International Airport incidents, staffing the EOC, staffing the Department"s Operations Center, implementing the City"s emergency operations plan, implementing the Fire Department"s disaster plan, and other emergency incidents that require a Division Chief"s expertise. With one Watch Commander (Division Chief) the Department would not be able to assure sufficient response and provide appropriate command and control to emergency incidents. Implementing this recommendation could jeopardize the safety of the public and firefighters /medics that serve them. A single 24-hour Watch Commander would simply not be able to manage all the emergency activities of the City.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.5 As a longer term operational objectives, evaluate whether the assignment function could be performed more economically using suppression staff.
· Assessment of Department
The Department disagrees with the recommendation of the audit.
Recommendation 2.3.1 of Section 2.3 Convert Some Uniform Positions Into Civilian Positions of the Auditor"s report recommends the civilianization of positions currently in the assignment office. The Department is confused by the contradiction in these recommendations.
The Department"s preliminary findings show the proposed cost savings associated with civilianization of the assignment office would not be achieved, while the efficiency of the assignment office would be hampered.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.6 Delete one excess Battalion Chief Position
·Assessment of Department
The Department disagrees with the recommendation of the audit.
There are no excess Battalion Chiefs in the SFFD. Presently, there are 41 Battalion Chiefs assigned to fire suppression, one Battalion Chief assigned to the Communications Center, and one Battalion Chief assigned to the Assignment Office. The Battalion Chief assigned as the Facilities Renovation Coordinator was transferred back to field suppression to reduce overtime necessary to backfill vacancies in that rank. The responsibilities of the Facilities Renovation Coordinator were transferred to the Captain of Support Services.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.7 Reduce the number of Fire Suppression Battalions from ten to six
· Assessment of Department
The Department disagrees with the recommendation of the audit.
The Battalion Chief is a middle management position under the direction of a Division Chief. Restructuring to six battalions would increase the span of control for a Battalion Chief to 14 units, well above the industry safety standards.
The Auditor fails to take recognize the significant administrative responsibilities of a Battalion Chief and their other activities necessary to prepare Department personnel for emergency and non-emergency responses. The use of unit utilization as the primary factor in recommending the reduction of suppression battalions is misleading and dangerous.
A list of the duties of the Battalion Chief includes but is not limited to:
· Commands all Fire Department companies, EMS, and specialized units
· Directs fire extinguishment, search & rescue, ventilation, salvage & overhaul, and other specialized emergency activities
· Directs and coordinates overall EMS operations with EMS Rescue Captain within their Battalion districts
· Gives general direction to nonfire department units assisting on the fireground
· In cooperation with the division and the assignment office, balances staffing levels of their districts
· Directs and ensures compliance with departmental policies and procedures, rules and regulations
· Conducts personnel and fire station inspections
· Monitors and evaluates personnel
· Directs personnel to appropriate referral units within the Department.
· Develops, implements, and monitors training programs (daily drills, Battalion drills, water rescue drills, cliff rescue drills, MCI drills, BART drills, Muni drills, specialized drills, etc.)
· Conducts building inspections including high-rise, public assembly, and target hazard buildings to ensure compliance with codes and ordinances
· Development of pre-fire plans
· Relays written correspondence, reports, and directives between Fire/Rescue companies and Department administration
· Conducts investigations and writes reports documenting vehicle accidents, unusual incidents and occurrences, and EEO complaints
· Conduct community relation activities and attends neighborhood meetings
· Conducts special research projects, as needed
· Responds to unit dispatches, when appropriate
· Directs and coordinates Fire Department operations under Disaster Operations plan in their specific Emergency Response Districts (ERD) as well as all disaster organizations and activities during large scale disasters
· Continuously evaluate and improve fire protection efficiency and effectiveness of the Department
· Staffs the Emergency Operations Center during disaster operations.
· Deployed as safety officer at all working fires
· Develops expertise and familiarization with routine and unique features within their respective battalion districts.
· Performs other duties as assigned by the Chief of Department
It is important to note that the role of the Battalion Chief has expanded in recent years. Battalion Chiefs play integral roles in Department workgroups and committees, carry out Departmental investigations, serve as liaisons to other Departments, and chair important operational taskforces.
A brief list of Battalion locations and major areas of responsibility is as follows:
· Battalion 1 located in North Beach / Chinatown and responds to BART, financial district high rises and Northpoint Sewer Treatment plant
· Battalion 2 located in Hayes Valley is in charge of the Hazardous Material Team
· Battalion 3 located South of Market must have a thorough expertise in Moscone Center, the Hall of Justice, and Treasure Island.
· Battalion 4 located in the upper Fillmore must have a thorough expertise in retro High-rise exempt buildings in Pacific Heights, the Presidio, Fort Mason, and the infirm areas of the Marina District
· Battalion 5 located in the Western Addition must have a thorough expertise in several hospitals including St. Mary"s, UCSF, Ralph K. Davies, Kaiser, and UC Mt. Zion
· Battalion 6 located in Noe Valley must have expertise in the extremely challenging firefighting tactics required in Bernal Heights, Noe and Eureka Valley, canyons of Glen Park and numerous old wood churches of the Mission District
· Battalion 7 located in the Richmond must have a thorough expertise in Surf and Cliff rescue
· Battalion 8 located in the Sunset must have a thorough expertise of Muni"s Lenox street Command Post, the San Francisco Zoo, Surf Rescue at Ocean beach, and the district"s major target hazards: Laguna Honda, the Youth Guidance Center, and the Recreation Center for the Handicapped
· Battalion 9 located in the Ingleside/ Oceanview must have a thorough expertise of San Francisco International Airport, and City College and San Francisco State University
· Battalion 10 located in the Bayview / Hunter"s Point must have expertise in large commercial construction and hazardous materials. This district is responsible for Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco General Hospital, the Produce Market and the Southeast Sewerage Treatment plant
· Battalion Chiefs are now part of the Metropolitan Medical Response System,
· Battalion Chiefs now respond to terrorist threats, bomb threats, weapons of mass destruction, etc.
· Battalion Chiefs are required to command the ten (10) emergency response district command centers (ERDs-decentralized disaster operations) by the City"s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
The expertise required within a Battalion by its chief can take years to assimilate. For instance, Battalion 5 has a large number of hospitals and buildings with state exempt fire protection systems, requiring familiarization and supervision.
The Battalion Chief plays a critical role in disaster operations. Six battalion chiefs are needed to staff the EOC on a 24-hour rotation required during disaster operations. During the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, all 10 Battalion Chiefs were deployed and overwhelmed responding to emergency calls throughout the City and County of San Francisco for a period well over 24 hours. The Auditor"s recommendation, if implemented would make proper command and control at multiple incidents impossible, creating a dangerous situation for the public and a safety hazard for firefighters.
There are numerous occasions through out the year when all 10 battalions and all 3 divisions are dispatched, deployed and on scene at emergency incidents at the same time.
The Battalion Chief must coordinate and oversee emergency operations from the interior of a dwelling on fire. A Battalions Chief"s span of control cannot be extended over 4 or 5 companies without compromising effective suppression operations and fireground safety. Coordinating operations in a fire building is by its nature extremely hazardous work, and any reduction in the existing battalion configuration will create this unsafe span of control at fires.
The NFPA recommends that Battalion Chief"s response times be consistent with Standard 1710, and meet the eight minute response time criteria. The current response time for some Battalion Chiefs in the Department already exceed the eight minute threshold. Any further reductions in the existing battalion configuration may create unsafe delays in their response.
Exhibit 2.1.8, the fire propagation curve provided by the NFPA graphically displays the criticality of the eight minute response time. Left unmitigated, the property damage caused by fire dramatically increase after the eighth minute as the fire is allowed to spread beyond the room of origin. In a City where property is as expensive as San Francisco, this represents the loss of millions of dollars annually.
Exhibit 2.1.8: NFPA Fire Propagation Curve
The Department recommends that the Board of Supervisors authorize, fund and deploy an eleventh(11th) Battalion district at the San Francisco International Airport. The Airport Division of the San Francisco Fire Department has three stations, eleven (11) pieces of apparatus, and 92 assigned members, making it one of the largest fire departments in San Mateo County. Currently, after business hours the highest ranking officer is a Captain, and there are no chiefs available on-site to provide critical incident command functions. Further, the level of specialization and expertise required for a commander to operate effectively at the Airport requires a 24 / 7 dedicated chiefs position.
While the Department is in disagreement with this recommendation of the Auditor, the Department, as part of the five (5) year strategic plan, will perform a work flow analysis regarding the deployment and appropriate use of Battalion Chiefs in the Department.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.8 Place a high priority on correcting the shortcomings evidenced in the Fire Department"s response to the questions listed in Attachment. 2.1.1
· Assessment of Department
The Department concurs with the recommendation of the audit.
· Department Action plan and timeline
The Department is currently reviewing the responses to the Auditor"s questionnaire and will be developing an action plan to address any shortcomings. The Department agrees with the Auditor that a significant amount of work is needed in this area. Therefore the completion date for this project is anticipated to be January of 2003.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.9 Evaluate its force structure in the light of its current mission so as to better align that structure with its current mission.
· Assessment of Department
The Department concurs with the recommendation of the audit.
· Department Action plan and timeline
The five (5) year strategic plan will identify necessary realignment of Department resources. The Department anticipates a one year development timeline for this plan.
· Recommendation of Auditor"s report
2.1.10 Transfer the Special Operations Section to the Deputy Chief of Operations
· Assessment of Department
The Department concurs with the recommendation of the audit.
The Department supports the Audit"s recommendation that a special operations group should report to the Deputy Chief of Operations.
The EMS Special Operations Section works closely with fire suppression personnel on projects that involve close integration of EMS and Fire resources such as special events coverage, technical rescue programs, and disaster planning. The EMS Special Operations Section is responsible for planning and on scene management of EMS coverage at Mass Gatherings and special events such as New Year"s Eve, Halloween, street fairs, parades, and sporting events. The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Special Operations Section provides planning, training, and management for the Department"s life safety components of disaster operations. The EMS Division is currently responsible for the management of the citywide Metropolitan Medical Task Force that provides interagency response to threats of terrorism. In addition, the Section Chief coordinates the Fire Department annual budget request for technical rescue, hazardous materials, cliff and water rescue, and terrorism preparedness to include working with the Bureau of Equipment (BOE) for purchases of special rescue equipment, materials, and maintenance.
The EMS Special Operations Section staff designs, conducts, and coordinates the following training programs:
_ Orientation to Special Operations activities for probationary employees
_ Emergency Medical Operations for Disaster Levels 1, 2, & 3
_ EMS component of: Hazardous Materials, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Marine Rescue, and Air Support
_ Joint Disaster Exercises with the Department of Public Health
_ Joint Metropolitan Medical Task Force drills
_ EMS training for Public Safety personnel such as SFPD tactical unit
_ Community Training on selected EMS related topics
Under the Deputy Chief of Operations, a Special Operations group would be responsible for coordination of all technical rescue programs such as high angle rescue, haz-mat, water rescue, confined space, etc. The group would further ensure the continuation of inter-agency coordination for joint operations at major emergency incidents and special events.
The Special Operations Section would continue to provide planning, training, and management for the Department"s life safety components of disaster operations to include the coordination of the interagency Task Force Operations for Weapons of Mass Destruction and development of an urban search and rescue team. The Special Operations Section would continue to produce special operations after-action reports to the Deputy Chief of Operations with the goal of improving overall integrated field performance.
The following issues must be addressed prior to creating a Special Operations group under the Deputy Chief of Operations:
· Appropriate staffing of the unit to include fire personnel along with the H43 EMS Section Chief and two Rescue Paramedic Captains
· Facilities for the Special Operations Unit, including administrative offices and storage space for special rescue vehicles and equipment
· Chain of command authority with respect to field personnel
· Development of a special operations budget
· Department Action plan and timeline
The Department will plan for the transition of Special Operation to Deputy Chief of Operations in FY 2002-2003
·Summary / Conclusion
It is worth remembering that the City of San Francisco burned almost to the ground five times before the turn of the last century. The damage sustained in Earthquake and Fire of 1906, when adjusted to reflect today"s dollars is still the most expensive natural disaster suffered in our nation"s history.
San Francisco"s place on a peninsula, surrounded on three sides by water, eliminates the possibility of automatic mutual aid that so many other cites rely on to augment their resources. Any mutual aid would be hindered if the bridges were compromised, and as earthquakes are felt over a wide geographic area, our neighboring cites will be charged with protecting their own jurisdictions. We were reminded of the City"s vulnerability to earthquakes in 1989, where water and gas main breaks made fires difficult to battle. The City"s aging infrastructure, water mains, hydrants, tanks and reservoirs remain for the most part untouched, fragile and likely to break in the next seismic event.
The Department is dedicated to implement policies and programs that will make it more efficient. The Department must not only prepare itself for response to fire and medical emergencies, but must acknowledge the new realities of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the nationwide increase in terrorist threats and activities. Recent events such as the Columbine High School massacre, the Oklahoma City bombing and the tragic events of September 11th are becoming all to commonplace on the American landscape.
The current configuration of Battalion and Division Chiefs has never been needed more to assure continued accountability and safety for both firefighters and the public we serve. The Department is receptive to any change that increases our ability to serve the public in a more efficient, effective and economic manner, but stands committed to ensuring that the principal force behind any decision is based not economic expediency but on enhancing the Department"s ability to provide critical emergency services to the resident and citizens of San Francisco.
1 Balloon construction: Typical technique for wood construction used before the mid 2oth century. IN balloon construction there are only vertical studs. This allows fire to spread quickly through walls and attics and remain undetected until it reaches critical volume.
2 Management Audit of the San Francisco Fire Department, 2002, pg.
3 National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1700; section 6-4-3