Management Audit of the San Francisco Fire Department Summary

January 22, 2002

 

Honorable Aaron Peskin, Chair
and Members of the Finance Committee
Board of Supervisors
Room 244, City Hall
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, CA 94102-4689

Dear Supervisor Peskin:

The Budget Analyst is pleased to present this Management Audit of the San Francisco Fire Department, which was prepared in response to motions adopted by the Board of Supervisors on January 24, 2000 and July 9, 2001. The report assesses the combined operations of fire suppression, fire marshal and emergency medical services functions of the Department.

The management audit report contains 23 findings which address a variety of issues related to the Department"s organization, administration and operations. Included are findings which provide recommendations to reduce middle management by realigning various functions, improve the management of staff and equipment resources, provide alternatives for service delivery, enhance fee determination and collections, manage fixed assets and supplies, and other improvements. We conservatively estimate that the implementation of these recommendations will produce approximately $7.0 million in annual savings and increased revenues for the City and County of San Francisco. This excludes savings from potential reductions in fire suppression command staffing, and budget savings resulting from more precise estimates of relief staffing required by the Department. A matrix summarizing these savings is included as Attachment 1 to this letter.

The management audit was conducted in accordance with Government Auditing Standards, 1994 Revision promulgated by the Comptroller General of the United States, United States General Accounting Office (as revised). In accordance with these standards, certain procedures were followed to ensure the factual accuracy of the report, and to provide the management of the Fire Department with an opportunity to comment on the report content. A written response from Department management has been included with our report, beginning on page 312.

That written response, which is lengthy, expresses the Department"s substantial agreement with a majority of the recommendations contained in the report. Included in the response is a matrix which lists all recommendations, showing whether the Department disagrees, agrees, or suggests further study (Fire Department response, Page V through Page VIII). Based on this matrix, the Department concurs with 79 of the 126 recommendations (63%) and agrees to analyze an additional 14 recommendations for implementation (11%), resulting in basic agreement with 93 of the 126 recommendations contained in the report (74%). In the Introduction to its response, the Department "acknowledges that the audit is a tool by which to gauge the past management practices of the Department, and seeks to identify areas where future cost savings could be made," and states that the audit "makes several recommendations embraced by the Department."

Yet, in the Response Introduction, the Department also characterizes the report as containing "flawed research" and asserts that "a number of the recommendations made in the audit were based on inaccurate data, effectively minimizing or invalidating them." We take exception to these characterizations.

For example, the Department states that "The audit significantly understates the achievements of the Department"s EMS (Emergency Medical Services) Program, again, based on flawed research. One notable example is the reference to the Department"s response times to Emergency Medical incidents." We strongly disagree with this statement.

Between March 12 and May 4, 2001, the Budget Analyst worked closely with EMS Division data management staff to develop EMS response time statistics since the merger. The base data was provided by either the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Division, by the Emergency Medical Services Agency (EMSA) [reviewed by the EMS Division], or taken directly from the FY 1999-2000 Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data report. The methodologies which we used for analyzing these data were reviewed extensively with SFFD staff who regularly conduct such analyses for the Department, and were found to be valid.

However, EMS Division management has made many changes to the Department"s internal response time analysis during recent months, with the most recent changes occurring after the Budget Analyst submitted a final draft report to the Fire Department for review. This ongoing modification of the Department"s response time analysis makes the process and motivation for changes suspect, and combined with the multiplicity of reasons given by EMS management for the changes, leads us to question the validity of the response time conclusions that the Department has reached. The fact that the Department continually made adjustments to its analysis until it arrived at a conclusion acceptable to EMS management, suggests that the Department is either incapable of accurately calculating ambulance response times, or has manipulated the results for some other purpose.

We are confident in the results of our response time analysis. We chose the data period that best reflects EMS activity since the Fire Department assumed responsibility for EMS services. We used consistent methodologies for analyzing this data, which are accepted within the emergency medical services community, and expressed the results of our analysis accordingly. The results were reviewed with both EMS and EMSA staff prior to publication in our report. For the Department to suggest otherwise is misleading and a false representation of the facts.

The Department states that "The recommendation to eliminate 66% of the existing Division Chiefs and 40% of the Battalion Chiefs from Suppression would cripple the Department"s ability to provide proper command and control of more than one major incident at any given time,"and suggests that we have recommended "severe cuts in the command and control staff in the Suppression Division (Division and Battalion Chiefs)." Again, this mischaracterizes our report.

In Section 2.1, we evaluate the fire suppression command structure based on practices in other Western cities, the utilization rate for command personnel in San Francisco, and other factors. However, we recognize that the comparison of command staffing utilized in other jurisdictions is a complex matter that requires the consideration of a number of variables. Yet the Department has not inventoried these variables or conducted analysis which would provide suitable information for making such a determination. When asked about whether such an analysis could be conducted by the Department, the Chief indicated that it would be performed as part of his budanalyst of the organization, which is presently being conducted. We encourage the Chief to include such an analysis in his organizational budanalyst, and provide the report to the Fire Commission and Board of Supervisors prior to budget deliberations for FY 2002-03.

The Department further states that "The audit compares San Francisco with other California cities and with Phoenix, Arizona. The Department finds that none of these cities has the population density, building characteristics, geographical and infrastructure characteristics of our city. Suitable comparisons to older, East Coast cities are shown in Section 2.1." At the exit conference, the Department made this argument and presented population density information for the cities of Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia and Los Angeles. At that time, Fire Department Managers were unable to provide any information for these jurisdictions on command structure, fire incidents, or other information which would allow an objective budanalyst of these jurisdictions for comparison. In the written response to the final report, the Fire Department has provided us with its first attempt at analyzing its command structure. No other analysis was presented to the Budget Analyst during this study.

Yet the Department"s analysis is still incomplete. One component that we have suggested for the Department to include is a longitudinal statistical analysis of the probability of major fire events occurring simultaneously in the City. This has not been conducted by the Department and, while descriptions of individual fire occurrences are interesting, they are meaningless without an objective budanalyst of alarm activity and distribution patterns.

We could not endorse the Fire Department"s command structure given the lack of suitable management analysis of the function of division and battalion chiefs within the San Francisco environment, and the significant disparities between the Department and other Western jurisdictions. Yet we feel it is incumbent upon management to objectively assess its needs, and avoid using anecdotes of greater alarm fire incidents, raising the specter of the tragedy of September 11, or comparing its operations to "sending the Army off to war with almost 50% fewer generals than during peacetime," to negate its responsibility to appropriately manage the taxpayers" resources.

While the Department"s statement that "The perennial danger of earthquake is now coupled with the threat of Terrorist strikes and Weapons of Mass Destruction attacks," provides an important perspective, it has little purpose except to incite the community, unless it is coupled with a comprehensive analysis of call activity and corresponding emergency response procedures during major disasters. That is why we recommend that the Department develop an analytical model based on statistical analysis of fire incidents, utilization rates for fire command staff and other factors which would better define division and battalion level staffing needs. As part of that analysis we recommend that the Department consider some of the specific reductions in middle management positions that we identified in our report.

The Department makes the statement that "The multiple recommendations for civilianization of positions currently held by uniformed staff are similarly flawed. The Department"s experience has shown that the civilianization of uniformed functions yields only short-term cost savings." This statement is overly broad and has no relevance to our study. The Department"s suggestion that "like work for like pay" issues are relevant to our recommendations for converting some sworn positions to civilian positions is also misleading.

In fact, for 17 of the 41 positions we recommend be converted to civilian classifications, no such issue exists. For these jobs, which are clerical and trade related, the duties performed would be most similar to civilian personnel assigned to other departments throughout the City. While recommendations to convert 24 sworn fire inspector positions to civilian fire inspector positions might be relevant to management"s concerns, wage parity issues for this group have long been resolved. We address these parity issues in our report and recognize that only $27,176 of the total $337,681 (8%) in savings identified in the finding are derived from this group. Such savings results from differences in the total benefit costs for sworn and non-sworn personnel who would perform these duties.

The Department has completely dismissed recommendations to merge the EMS administrative functions with the remainder of the Department as posing "serious concerns and timing problems." However, we believe that the continued separation of EMS from other emergency response functions of the Fire Department is inappropriate. The implementation of recommendations contained in our report would complete the integration of fire suppression and emergency medical services originally envisioned with the transfer of EMS to the Fire Department in 1997. Currently, the Fire Department has only partially integrated its fire suppression and EMS administration, policy development, training and service delivery functions that has resulted in a duplication of support activities in some areas, a lack of organizational support for certain EMS policy initiatives, parallel and incongruent training approaches, and separate chains of command.

As the Department moves forward, the lack of meaningful integration of its two principal functions will continue to hamper its organizational effectiveness. For example, the Department continues to recruit solely into the H-2 Fire Fighter classification, instead of broadening its recruitment efforts to include candidates with advanced emergency medical service training. Similarly, many more resources are devoted to the Department"s fire suppression-focused Division of Training than to its training sections within the EMS Division, even though 70 percent of the Department"s workload is emergency medical services related. This reflects both a strategic and a training failure, and is likely to reinforce some of the cultural friction between fire suppression and EMS staff that surfaced during our study.

In addition, the lack of integration between fire suppression and EMS is expensive. In several of the sections related to the reorganization of EMS administrative functions we have recommended middle management staff realignments which would complement a streamlined organization. In some instances staff reductions are warranted. For example, an Administrative Section Chief position, who is assigned a dedicated Senior Clerk Typist position, is now responsible for managing just five staff members at an annual cost of $193,467. An Assistant Deputy Chief II is responsible for managing just six staff members, at an annual cost of $137,421 per year. We have recommended that the staff assigned to this Section Chief be reassigned elsewhere in the Department, and that the Administrative Section Chief and Senior Clerk Typist positions be deleted. We have made similar recommendations regarding the Assistant Deputy Chief II position.

The Department"s response to changes which affect it "fiscally" demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of our finding related to the suppression staffing analysis that is performed by the Department. The Department states that "the staffing model proposed would increase the Department"s salary costs by $17.5 million." This assertion by the Department is unqualifiedly incorrect.

In fact, the Department used assumptions for relief staffing in its analysis of staffing needs which overstated relief for vacation, sick and disability leave by approximately 4 percent. In a department which requires 1,242 employees to merely cover its base operations (without relief), this assumption error overstated the Department"s staffing need by approximately 50 positions, resulting in over $4.2 million in excess costs being estimated for FY 2001-02, based on changes from the Departments" original budget model. At the same time the Department ignored the impact from the average of 14 firefighters each day who are assigned to limited duty, and are always backfilled with overtime. To staff appropriately to backfill for these positions results in no additional cost, and could result in substantial savings if the Department is ever able to reduce its significant workers compensation and disability usage rates. As demonstrated in Section 2.2, such reductions would result in straight time being less costly than overtime for firefighter employees.

Similarly, the Department states that "the changes to the shift-trade policy . . . would cost over $3 million, based on 2001-02 rates." At the exit conference, it was stated by the Department that if management took a more active role overseeing shift trades between employees, that costs would increase because staff would begin to use additional sick leave to counter the greater level of management scrutiny that we have suggested. This appears to be the source of the $3 million additional cost estimate.

We disagree with the Department"s rationale for the estimate and question the argument that it makes. Instead, we suggest that management fully embrace the City"s efforts to limit unjustified sick leave use by Fire Department employees, while simultaneously implementing greater controls over staffing coverage. In the Fire Department, persons on sick leave increased from an average of 15 employees per day in FY 1996-97, to nearly 25 FTEs per day in FY 2000-01 (a 67 percent increase in four years). In fact, approximately 14 percent of all staff are absent each day due to sick leave and disability leave, or are assigned to limited duty activities. To suggest that the Department is helpless to curb further increases in sick leave use is an abdication of management"s responsibility in this area.

Lastly, the Department states that "Operationally, the audit proposes significant reductions in Fire and Emergency Medical Services to the City (50% of Suppression Chiefs and 25% of ambulance staff) despite clear evidence that the demand for emergency services continues to increase." These statements are absolutely false. In fact, we have recommended that only one battalion chief position be eliminated (who had been assigned to fire house improvement and seismic upgrades, a project essentially complete), representing less than 2% of the battalion chief staffing strength. For the remaining suppression command staff, we have recommended that the Chief consider reductions as he completes his strategic plan, based on practices in other jurisdictions, personnel utilization rates, fire incident analysis and other factors. WE HAVE RECOMMENDED NO REDUCTIONS IN FIRE FIGHTING PERSONNEL.

For "ambulance staff," we have recommended that the Department use some "short-shift" ambulances (i.e., ambulance teams which are scheduled for 10-hour rather than 24-shifts, in order to provide enhanced coverage during the busiest periods), which results in a reduction of 13 positions-a 1.4% reduction in the 921 positions that the Department plans to utilize to provide emergency medical services.

The following discussions summarize the findings contained in our report.

1.1 Reorganize Administrative Functions

The Fire Department manages its emergency medical services administrative functions separately from its fire suppression administrative functions. This divides management accountability for various administrative activities, and reinforces an inappropriate distinction between fire suppression and emergency medical services.

The Fire Department should eliminate the EMS Administration Section and integrate its former functions into existing Fire Department administrative divisions. The EMS Administration Section"s responsibilities for emergency medical services electronic data collection and reporting, the Continuous Quality Improvement Program, and risk management should be transferred to a new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit. The responsibility for billing and revenue collection, related medical records management, and administration of fee amendments should be transferred to the Division of Finance. The tracking, disbursement, and maintenance of emergency medical system equipment and supplies should be transferred to the Bureau of Equipment.

Consolidating similar administrative and technical functions would streamline the Fire Department"s administrative structure and processes, would support the integration of fire suppression and emergency medical services, and would eliminate two positions.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should:

1.1.1 Eliminate the EMS Administration Section.

1.1.2 Delete 1.0 FTE Classification H-43 EMS Administration Section Chief position, and 1.0 FTE Classification 1426 Senior Clerk Typist position.

1.1.3 Transfer responsibility for emergency medical services electronic data collection and reporting, the Continuous Quality Improvement Program, and risk management to the proposed Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit.

1.1.4 Delete 2.0 FTE Classification H-33 Rescue Captain positions.

1.1.5 Transfer $221,321 in savings from the deleted H-33 Rescue Captain positions to fund civilian positions in the proposed Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit, who would perform data management and CQI functions.

1.1.6 Transfer the responsibility for the emergency medical service billing and revenue collection function, related medical records management, and the administration of fee amendments to the Division of Finance.

1.1.7 Transfer 1.0 FTE Classification 2112 Medical Records Technician position and the 1.0 FTE Classification 2110 Medical Records Clerk position to the Division of Finance.

1.1.8 Transfer the responsibility for tracking, disbursing, and maintaining emergency medical services equipment and supplies to the Bureau of Equipment.

1.1.9 Transfer the 1.0 FTE H-3 Fire Fighter Paramedic position, responsible for biomedical equipment, to the Bureau of Equipment.

There would be no new costs to implement these recommendations.

Consolidating similar administrative and technical functions would streamline the Fire Department"s administrative structure and processes, support the integration of fire suppression and emergency medical services, and require two less positions.

Eliminating the 1.0 FTE Classification H-43 EMS Administration Section Chief position, and the 1.0 FTE Classification 1426 Senior Clerk Typist position would save a total of $193,267 per year.

An additional $221,321 per year in savings from eliminating two H-33 Rescue Captain positions would be available to fund civilian positions in the proposed Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit (see Section 1.3).

1.2 Integrate Management Services

The Management Services Division"s original mission of implementing the Consent Decree is now completed. Further, the Division"s remaining support activities should be transferred to the Department"s other organizational units, with which they are more appropriately aligned.

By eliminating this Division, the Department would have a more streamlined organizational structure, and realize cost savings of at least $137,421 annually in management and support costs.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

1.2.1 Re-distribute functions in the Management Services Division as follows:

A. transfer four of the five Investigative Services functions to the Human Resources Division (as described in this report),

B. transfer the Records Unit to Arson,

C. transfer Mail & Reproduction to Support Services,

D. transfer the Neighborhood Emergency Response Team Training Program to the Division of Training,

E. combine Community Affairs with Public Information, and

F. transfer the Assignments Office to the Deputy Chief of Operations (CD2).

1.2.2 Eliminate the Management Services Division,

1.2.3 Prepare a new General Order that delineates the authority of the Chief of Department to designate various staff on an as-needed basis to conduct internal affairs investigations.

1.2.4 Eliminate one position of H51 Assistant Deputy Chief II

1.2.5 Convert Assignments Office uniform positions to civilian positions, in accordance with the recommendation in Section 2.3 of this report,

1.2.6 Follow provisions of the new MOU pertaining to the use of limited duty personnel, especially in the Mail and Reproduction Unit to ensure appropriate work assignments and measures to prevent abuse.

There would be no new costs to implement these recommendations.

Benefits from implementing the recommendations are approximately $137,421 per year from the salary and benefits savings of the eliminated position. An undetermined dollar amount would be saved by converting uniform positions to civilian positions in the Assignments Office.

1.3 Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit

The Fire Department lacks a single coordinating point for policy development, strategic planning, performance analysis, research, continuous quality improvement, risk management, and grant writing functions.

As a result, the Fire Department management team lacks coordinated input from professional analysts who have an organizational overview. This hinders the integration of the Fire Department"s dual, equally important fire suppression and emergency medical services provider roles.

The Fire Department should establish a Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit. New analytical staff would work with managers and other key departmental staff to (a) lead departmental policy development, (b) prepare an annual strategic plan, (c) develop performance measures and performance monitoring tools, (d) manage research, continuous quality improvement, and risk management projects, and (e) write grant applications.

The new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit could be established as either (1) an extension of the current Division of Finance, at an additional cost of $345,702; (2) a direct report to the Deputy Chief of Administration, at an additional cost of $482,954; (3) a part of a new Division of Finance and Strategic Policy, at an additional cost of $508,277; or, (4) a direct report to the Fire Chief, at an additional cost of $482,954. We recommend Alternative 4. To partially offset these new costs, $221,321 could be transferred from the EMS Administration Section if that section is eliminated.

The new Unit would provide (a) coordinated advice from professional analysts to the Fire Department management team; (b) an enhanced organizational perspective on the integration of fire suppression and emergency medical services; (c) a regularly updated strategic plan; (d) organizational performance measures and reporting; (e) a reactivated research function, (f) consistent application of continuous quality improvement and risk management strategies; and, (g) an enhanced grant writing capability.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should:

1.3.1 Prepare a request to the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors for the number of positions and funding necessary to form a Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit which reports to him directly (Alternative 4), as described in this report.

Establishing a new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit would have annualized salary and mandatory fringe benefit costs totaling $430,492 at the top salary steps. One-time implementation costs of $52,462 would bring the total additional first year cost to $482,954. To offset these new costs, $221,321 could be transferred from the EMS Administration Section, if that section is eliminated. This transfer would result in a net additional cost of $261,633 per year.

1.4 Reorganize Training and Education

Fire Department training and education functions are currently spread across the Division of Training and three sections of the EMS Division.

Structural and management fragmentation hinders integration of the Department"s fire suppression and emergency medical services responsibilities, complicates management accountability, creates the potential for unevenly applied training and education quality standards, and increases costs.

The Fire Department should transfer the EMS Academy Section and the EMS In-service Training Section to a renamed Division of Fire and Medical Training.

The Fire Department should restructure the new Division of Fire and Medical Training to integrate training and education responsibilities, and to reduce the number of direct reports to the new Director of Fire and Medical Training. This reduction in direct reports should be achieved through rationalization of management positions which have overlapping areas of responsibility.

The Fire Department should direct the Director of Fire and Medical Training to (a) work with the new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit to ensure that appropriate performance measures are developed for all training courses, and (b) monitor all training managers" performance against those measures.

Implementation of a more streamlined Division of Fire and Medical Training would result in a more integrated and strategic approach to training and education, clearer management accountabilities, and evenly applied training quality standards. Lower costs could be achieved through better coordination of training and education resources.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should:

1.4.1 Transfer the EMS Academy Section and the EMS In-service Training Section to a renamed Division of Fire and Medical Training during FY 2001-2002.

1.4.2 Recruit widely for the new Director of Fire and Medical Training position, advertising for someone with both fire suppression and emergency medical services training experience.

1.4.3 Restructure the Division of Fire and Medical Training during FY 2001-2002 to integrate training and education functions for fire suppression and emergency medical services, and to reduce the number of direct reports to the Director of Fire and Medical Training by FY 2002-2003.

1.4.4 Direct the Director of Fire and Medical Training to (a) work with the new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit to ensure that appropriate performance measures are developed for all training courses delivered by the Division of Fire and Medical Training, and (b) monitor all training managers" performance against those performance measures.

The transfer of the EMS Academy Section and the EMS In-service Training Section to the Division of Training would be cost neutral in FY 2001-2002.

Restructuring training and education functions would result in annual net personnel cost savings of $152,632.

Implementation of a more streamlined Division of Fire and Medical Training would result in a more integrated and strategic approach to training and education, clearer management accountabilities, and the even application of training and education quality standards. Lower costs could result from better coordination of training and education resources.

1.5 Centralize Training Facilities

The Fire Department"s current training facilities are located at three different sites, two of which are in the core area of San Francisco and the third is at Treasure Island.

Other than logistical matters associated with performing a common function at separate sites, many opportunities for providing training in a seamless manner are lost, and overall training costs are higher than they might otherwise be if provided from an integrated facility.

Although Treasure Island is not the preferred location for a combined training facility, it is a workable alternative which should be considered along with others.

Therefore, the Fire Department should develop specifications for a combined training facility, work with the Department of Real Estate to identify and obtain such a site, and compare those results with the option of operating a combined training facility at Treasure Island. This analysis should also consider maximizing the value of the owned Fire College site. Additionally, the Department should evaluate possible administrative changes and other resource-sharing opportunities that can be implemented to achieve improved cost effectiveness in training.

Costs cannot be determined at this time because of inadequate information on alternatives. However, the operational benefits of an alternative plan should include economies of scale, reinforcement of the Department"s multifaceted role (fire suppression and medical services), better utilization of trainers, and more effective utilization of current Department-owned properties.

Recommendations

The San Francisco Fire Department should:

1.5.1 Develop a set of specifications regarding desired land area, improvements and other special features of a site to accommodate a combined training facility.

1.5.2 Evaluate possible administrative changes and resource-sharing opportunities that can be implemented to achieve improved cost effectiveness in training.

1.5.3 Work closely with the Department of Real Estate (DRE) to identify and obtain a site within the City and County of San Francisco that generally meets the newly developed specifications.

1.5.4 Working with the Department of Real Estate and design consultants, prepare a cost benefit budanalyst of alternatives for centralizing training and present it to the Fire Commission prior to forwarding it to the Mayor and Board of Supervisors.

1.5.5 Include all aspects of the alternative development opportunities, including offsetting financial benefits to be derived from the sale or transfer of the Folsom Street property to another City agency, reduced lease costs and potential operational benefits to be derived from the combined facility.

1.5.6 Submit the completed budanalyst of alternatives to the Fire Commission within one year of the date of this report.

Some costs would be incurred by the Department of Real Estate and for design consultants, for the development of the report on training site consolidation. However, such costs cannot be reliably estimated at this time.

The Department would be better positioned to replace training space at the Presidio property that may be lost in the short term, and for achieving potential cost savings and efficiencies that could result from the consolidation of training space at a single location. While total savings cannot be determined at this time, they could be substantial. The present value of the Treasure Island lease is $60 million over the expected useful life of a new facility, and the value of the Folsom Street property is substantial.

1.6 Modify Recruitment Strategies

The Fire Department only recruits Classification H-2 Fire Fighters. This does not reflect the Fire Department"s actual workload which is dominated by emergency medical services.

The Fire Department should recruit people with prior fire science, Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), paramedic, and/or advanced education qualifications, and formalize career development programs for staff. The Fire Department should also expand Cadet Program course content to include paramedic experience, and expand recruits" field probation experience to include an ambulance assignment, in order to assess their aptitude for advanced EMT training. These recommendations would result in the recruitment of staff members more suited to the Fire Department"s primary work activities.

On-duty paramedic cross-training is provided to Fire Department staff through an in-house EMS Academy. The EMS Academy has added only 27 fully cross-trained Classification H-3 Fire Fighter Paramedics to the Fire Department workforce from its first three classes (since December 1996), at a cost of approximately $72,833 per graduated student.

The Fire Department should analyze future paramedic training options so that it can prepare a cost benefit comparison between: (a) undertaking its own paramedic training, and (b) utilizing paramedic training provided by other public and private sector agencies. The Fire Department should also analyze the costs and benefits of requiring staff to undertake cross-training off-duty. These analyses could potentially lead to cost savings if the Fire Department determines that there are less costly ways to provide paramedic cross-training.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should:

1.6.1 Direct the new Division of Fire and Medical Training, with support from the new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit, to:

  • Develop a recruitment process, which recruits applicants with prior EMT or paramedic training, and/or advanced science education, and which gives preference to applicants with advanced education qualifications.
     
  • Incorporate external review panels into the recruitment process.
     
  • Expand the Cadet Program course content to include paramedic experience.
     
  • Expand Classification H-2 Fire Fighter recruits" field probation experience to include an ambulance assignment.
     
  • Develop formalized career development programs for staff.

1.6.2 Review the deadlines for recruitment diversity goals to ensure that the Fire Department has sufficient Classification H-3 Fire Fighter Paramedics to meet its service obligations.

1.6.3 Analyze future paramedic training options so that the Fire Department can prepare a cost benefit comparison between an in-house EMS Academy and utilizing paramedic training provided by other public and private sector agencies.

1.6.4 Analyze the costs and benefits of requiring staff to undertake their cross-training off-duty.

There would be no costs to implement these recommendations because each of these recommendations could be performed by existing Fire Department staff.

These recommendations would result in (a) the recruitment of staff members more suited to the Fire Department"s actual workload, which has been increasingly dominated by emergency medical services since July 1, 1997, (b) a recruitment process which takes more account of applicants" prior qualifications, which would both improve the caliber of recruits and reduce the length of training they require, and (c) training which provides recruits with the EMT and/or paramedic skills they need. Analysis of future paramedic cross-training options, and the costs and benefits of requiring staff to undertake their cross-training off-duty, could potentially lead to cost savings if the Fire Department determines that there are less costly ways to provide paramedic cross-training.

1.7 Disability and Workers Compensation

Departmental costs related to industrial injuries and illness are high and generally increasing. In part, this condition may result from leave abuses, reflected in the high use of overtime and disability claims, and permitted by weak internal controls. On average, more than 20 percent of the uniformed employees scheduled for fire suppression duty were absent every day in Fiscal Year 2000-01 under the aegis of several approved leave categories. The interrelationship of these different categories is complex, often obscuring the total cost impact. To illustrate: the costs for overtime, workers compensation and disability pay together exceeded $24 million in Fiscal Year 2000-01, which is more than 11 percent of the Department"s current year operating budget. Sick leave and temporary modified duty (aka limited duty) are other cost-driving components of this overall problem, but their direct dollar costs are not included in the $24 million.

While a historical adverse expenditure trend appears to be changing in the area of workers compensation and new return-to-work efforts are now underway, much more is needed in the areas of injury education and prevention, and information gathering and reporting. Taken together, these trends and interrelationships illustrate the fundamental deficiency uncovered by our review: the Department lacks a comprehensive and strategic industrial safety program. There is no central office or position assigned the responsibility of coordinating the Department"s resources in a systematic approach to cost reduction in these related areas. Notwithstanding the complexities and financial impact of this specific problem, the Budget Analyst believes that the safety program is the first and most important step toward a solution. Two positions are recommended to staff this function with their organizational placement to be specified by the Chief of the Department. There are additional measures that the Department can implement to ensure success, all of which should be coordinated as integral parts of the comprehensive safety program.

The Fire Department should continue working with the Department of Human Resources Workers Compensation Division on related information systems applications, seek to mitigate disability retirement costs through more rigorous review of claims, expand return-to-work activities while stabilizing the use of limited duty, convert uniform positions to civilian positions where appropriate to reduce disability pay exposure, and vigorously monitor and manage disability pay. Additionally, the Department should establish practicable targets for the use of leave benefits and enhance the disability pay and workers compensation claims management processes.

Recommendations

The San Francisco Fire Department should:

1.7.1 Create a comprehensive Safety Program to ensure that activities pertaining to sick leave, disability pay, workers compensation and limited duty are properly coordinated with other Departmental activities-such as recruitment, training and financial management-and administered to reduce the impact on overtime and optimize the use of limited duty.

1.7.2 Establish practicable targets through and in cooperation with the Safety Program for the use of sick leave, disability pay and limited duty assignments in the Department"s staffing model.

1.7.3 Utilize its current authority to initiate Industrial Disability Retirements, as appropriate.

1.7.4 Participate more directly with the Department of Human Resources Workers Compensation Division in the careful review of all retiree claims to ensure in a timely manner that they meet the legal requirements for acceptance and are not improperly approved due to inattention or carelessness.

1.7.5 Assist in the vigorous scrutiny of all new industrial injury claims by active uniformed personnel for assurance of adequacy before acceptance.

1.7.6 Continue working with the Department of Human Resources Workers Compensation Division to enhance the Fire Department"s information system applications for purposes of a comprehensive safety program, tracking claims and more effectively dealing with industrial injuries and illnesses.

1.7.7 Establish two positions (H30 Captain or equivalent civilian and 6137 Assistant Industrial Hygienist) to manage a comprehensive and strategic industrial safety program that addresses the full range of human and environmental factors in a proactive and systematic way.

1.7.8 Convert uniform positions to civilian positions where appropriate to reduce disability pay exposure (please refer to Section 2.3 of this report).

1.7.9 Vigorously enforce the Department"s existing policy of a one-year limit on limited-duty assignments.

1.7.10 Work cooperatively with the Department of Human Resources and establish internal procedures to monitor sick leave use against the Pilot Incentive Wellness Program to validate its effectiveness.

The creation of a Safety Program for the Department is projected to cost $191,196 annually for two positions. Beyond that, the program will have no additional costs since they will be based on the reallocation of existing resources.1

The annual benefits from this recommendation, however, are expected to be in the $250,000 range, covering reduced accident and industrial-injury claims cost as well as less damage to property. This benefit amount would not include the separate savings from newly achieved targets of lower sick and disability pay usage, and a stabilized level of limited duty, conservatively accounting for an additional $800,000 combined.

Implementation of the Industrial Disability Retirement recommendation will result in a conservative estimate of $150,000 in savings per year. The Wellness Incentive Program will have no cost impact above the amount for the current program, but result in an additional minimum annual savings of $150,000, based on the number of eligible employees who retire.

Reviewing workers compensation claims of active uniform personnel and retirees more vigorously is projected to require only one person day per month total, and result in savings of $100,000 each year over the Fiscal Year 2000-01 base.

More aggressive recruiting in the manner recommended will allow the Department to maintain a ready pool of lateral hires and cadet candidates for placement in the training classes, scheduled to coincide with planned separations. Similarly, working with the Department of Human Resources Workers Compensation Division to coordinate claims management information system issues and procedures will provide the Department with state-of-the-art data management and reporting capabilities to support and enhance the Safety Program.

Removing selected premiums from the disability pay calculation would most likely be part of a resources exchange since the recommendation requires negotiations with the Firefighters Local 798. However, it is assumed that even under such circumstances, this action would result in net estimated savings of at least $50,000 each fiscal year.

Enforcement of the existing limited duty policy is viewed as a no-cost item.

The total of all estimated savings is approximately $1.3 million. The actual savings would be determined by the number of sworn personnel that retire, and their individual sick-leave balances and length of service

1.8 Apparatus and Vehicle Management

The SFFD does not have a comprehensive, strategic approach to fleet management. The Department"s vehicle replacement plan, proposed in 1987, is out of date, does not include ambulances and was never fully implemented. In addition, the Department does not maintain an up-to-date, accurate inventory on all vehicles and capital equipment.

The Department is somewhat disadvantaged and service quality is potentially compromised by lack of clear policies and planning for the replacement of some of its most critical service-related assets. The lack of clear policy results in inefficient management of the overall fleet. The absence of a replacement plan and supporting justification places the frontline fleet in jeopardy from inadequate resources in the future. This also presents a potential safety issue, as the reserve fleet is often insufficient to accommodate service needs when equipment is out for maintenance or responding to mutual aid calls.

The SFFD should develop and implement an updated, comprehensive Apparatus Management and Replacement Plan that includes all apparatus as well as auxiliary equipment, and addresses the issue of fleet management. This plan should be kept current and presented annually to the Fire Commission for review.

The Department also should explore the development of a funding strategy for the Plan, prepare written policies and procedures for apparatus and vehicle management, utilize an updated information tracking system, and rotate passenger vehicles based on utilization patterns.

For a nominal one-time cost to develop, this plan can help to ensure a continuous stream of apparatus and vehicles to maintain high quality services. Further, implementation of these recommendations will facilitate full compliance with Government Accounting Board Statement No. 34 (GASB-34), and reduce uncertainty associated with repairs and replacement.

Recommendations

The San Francisco Fire Department should:

1.8.1 Prepare a written policy and set of procedures that cover management of the Department"s apparatus.

1.8.2 Prepare a strategic and updated comprehensive Vehicle Maintenance and Replacement Plan, implement a related Program for all Department vehicles, and ensure Department-wide compliance with the plan. This plan should be updated annually to reflect inventory changes and budgetary actions.

1.8.3 Develop information tracking systems to monitor vehicle depreciation, value, usage hours, mileage, costs of maintenance, repairs and accidents and all other relevant information in a centralized database to ensure that inventories are accurate and can be effectively used to manage the entire fleet as well as facilitate the Controller"s compliance with requirements of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 34 .

1.8.4 Develop a system to ensure that Department vehicles and apparatus receive the proper preventive maintenance.

1.8.5 Rotate passenger vehicles in order to smooth out utilization rates.

1.8.6 Evaluate whether the Department has too many passenger vehicles and if so, work with the Purchaser"s Office to properly dispose of the excess. If the reverse is true, make certain that the Plan addresses and includes justification for additional needs.

1.8.7 Explore alternative funding strategies for vehicle replacement and include a recommendation in the Plan.

1.8.8 Evaluate vehicle assignments to determine the appropriateness of assigning vehicles to on-call personnel who reside a substantial distance from the City.

1.8.9 Review and reach a clear understanding with the Purchaser"s Central Shops on the circumstances under and the extent to which the Department will be able to contract directly with outside vendors for apparatus maintenance.

1.8.10 Follow the recommendation in another section of this report to civilianize positions of uniformed personnel in the Bureau of Equipment that function primarily as mechanics.

1.8.11 Include in the training regimen for the head of the Bureau of Equipment classes in professional fleet management.

A regular and stable vehicle replacement schedule would eliminate the need in the future for acquiring a large number of vehicles in the same budget cycle. It also could prevent a large part of the fleet from aging at the same time, therefore avoiding the necessity of large acquisitions to replace many vehicles -unless that was part of a deliberate strategy by the Department to achieve a lower per-unit acquisition cost. In addition, regularly replacing vehicles when they can no longer be operated economically would eliminate the need for costly repairs of aging vehicles and a reduction in the Department"s maintenance and repair costs. Improved maintenance of apparatus would also contribute to lowering vehicle maintenance costs.

The Department would have more accurate and complete inventory and maintenance records from which to evaluate apparatus utilization and cost efficiency.

Establishing effective management systems may require some modest level of one-time additional resources; however, on-going maintenance of proper records and monitoring vehicle records should be possible with the present level of staffing. The PeopleSoft software currently being implemented may be capable of handling the processing and storage of data necessary for these needs.

1.9 Vehicle Accidents

Sixty-eight percent of accidents involving Fire Department vehicles in FY 2000-2001, were found by Department investigators to be caused by inattention or by the poor judgment of Fire Department personnel.

Accident reports are incomplete and inaccurate, and there is no central or common source for all information pertaining to vehicular accidents.

This has potentially serious adverse consequences for the Department in terms of impacts on equipment and personnel costs as well as on overall service quality to the general public.

The Department should broaden its risk-management strategy by (a) improving linkage with the training program, focusing on remedial training for aerial ladder truck operators, (b) analyzing available data to determine if any physical facility or equipment design changes are warranted, (c) reviewing and revising, as appropriate the associated information system to provide better accident data to management, and (d) ensuring that these activities are part of a coordinated safety program.

At a nominal cost, the Department can produce better-trained and more confident operators, reduce the number of accidents attributable to Departmental personnel, lower apparatus repair costs, and reduce tort liability exposure.

Recommendations

The San Francisco Fire Department should:

1.9.1 Prepare policies and procedures to cover a comprehensive strategy for management of vehicular accident data, and coordinate with other appropriate units within the Department to reduce cost and liability.

1.9.2 Utilize the Department"s PeopleSoft system as the data storage and reporting tool to track vehicular accidents.

1.9.3 Incorporate the vehicular accident program into a broader Department-wide Safety Program.

1.9.4 Incorporate issues from analyses of accident data into specific training sessions and procedures.

The Safety Program cost will be determined by its size and content. However, that cost will be shared with other "program" elements and units of the Department, and be offset by savings from reduced expenditures in other health and safety areas, such as workers compensation, disability pay and sick pay.

The expected benefits from implementing the above recommendations include better-trained and more confident operators, fewer accidents, lower repair costs for accidents that are unavoidable, and reduced liability exposure. Better reporting capability for vehicle accidents will lead to better-informed management.

1.10 Facilities Maintenance

The Department"s capital improvement and facilities maintenance program are disjointed, without sufficient advance planning or coordination of projects with other key City departments.

Available capital funds are not expended in a timely manner, and needed improvements are not completed as required to ensure safe and functioning infrastructure that supports service delivery.

Coordination and cooperation with other City departments in procurement and construction could be improved with a formal plan that is comprehensive, that prioritizes projects, and that identifies funding sources.

The Department should develop a written policy and procedures to ensure formal, continuing documentation, and review the City"s procurement procedures to determine whether or not rules governing vendor selection should be modified.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

1.10.1 Develop a formal policy and set of procedures to provide for a rolling Comprehensive (Five-Year) Capital Improvement Plan, that includes a section detailing the major facilities maintenance activities scheduled for the next fiscal year.

1.10.2 Review the City"s procurement procedures with the Purchaser"s Office to determine the possibility of modifying the limitations on vendor selection by departments.

This is a low-cost activity that will facilitate Department prioritization of projects and improve interdepartmental cooperation.

The benefits include a more rational capital improvements program, more Departmental control and flexibility in the area of facilities maintenance, and improved interdepartmental coordination and cooperation for project priorities.

1.11 CAD/AIS System Issues

TRW, Inc., and the City entered into an agreement in September 1997 for TRW to deliver an enhanced Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD)/ Automated Information System (AIS). The CAD is designed to select the appropriate fire suppression/EMS unit or units for dispatch and record the time sensitive events that transpire between receipt of an emergency call and incident closure. The AIS was developed to support a variety of administrative functions, including providing certain information to the CAD. The systems became operational in April 2000.

TRW and the City entered into a Settlement Agreement effective July 5, 2001, because the City and TRW were unable to resolve a number of disputed issues relating to the scope of work under the Project Agreement, including delays in contractor performance and the City"s imposition of $1.5 million in liquidated damages.

The usefulness and reliability of the CAD/AIS systems are impaired due to significant defects that have not been corrected, and certain desired enhancements that have not been implemented. For example, the Automatic Vehicle Locating (AVL) system, intended to provide graphic display of ambulance units onto CAD mapping for use by dispatchers, is not used primarily because of problems in the mapping function. Also, according to the Fire Department"s MIS section, the Inventory and Facilities modules are unusable.

A significant deficiency in the Fire Department"s fire suppression operations is the lack of on-line fire prevention information available to fire suppression officers responding to fires. For example, information such as the presence of any hazardous materials at a fire location is not readily available.

Recommendations

The Fire Department and the Emergency Communications Department should:

1.11.1 Jointly develop a prioritized list of defects and desired enhancements to the CAD/AIS, and work with the Department of Telecommunications and the CAD/AIS contractors to obtain the full-required functions of those systems.

1.11.2 Jointly develop and execute a plan to obtain full functioning of the AVL system to assist in dispatching medical units.

The Fire Department should:

1.11.3 Adopt a plan for developing the complete operational capability of supplying Fire Prevention information to units responding to emergency incidents. The plan should be submitted to the Mayor and to the Board of Supervisors.

The Fire Department"s MIS section estimates the cost of fixing the AIS modules will be approximately $3 million. To that figure must be added the cost of manually inputting relevant Fire Prevention data into the Fire Prevention database so that the MDTs and the CAD can access the information. As with as complex computer systems, ongoing maintenance of and improvements to the CAD/AIS will be required.

By implementing the recommended changes, the Fire Department will be able to more effectively utilize the CAD/AIS, potentially be able to reduce response times by being better able to identify emergency units for call response, and improve firefighter safety and suppression success by having immediate access to critical prevention information at the fire scene.

1.12 Communications Center Operations

Responsibility for answering calls for fire, rescue, and emergency medical assistance, and dispatching units to reported incidents, was transferred from the Fire Department to the Emergency Communications Department (ECD) in April 2000. However, uniformed Fire Department personnel, most of whom consider Communications Center duty as being highly undesirable, continue to staff the positions necessary to perform dispatch functions.

The system used by Fire/EMS Dispatch since the spring of 1998 to triage emergency medical calls for assistance is a manual system known as Criteria Based Dispatch (CBD). Use of CBD has been problematic almost from its inception: Evaluations by the Health Department"s Emergency Medical Services Section have resulted in multiple unsatisfactory ratings, primarily because Fire/EMS Call Evaluators very often do not follow CBD protocols. The EMS Administrator has informed the Budget Analyst that recent repeated failures of Call Evaluators to follow CBD protocols may have contributed to "untoward" medical outcomes. The EMS Administrator has stated that the EMS Administration is determining what specific actions will remedy the current situation.

The ECD intends to replace the uniformed Fire Department personnel with civilian Call Takers/ Dispatchers by September 30, 2003, provided that adequate funding to replace Fire Department personnel is authorized for this purpose and sufficient new staff is available. That action would require an initial outlay of approximately $2.3 million, and would result in salary savings of approximately $2 million annually, in ensuing years. Additional potential annual savings of up to approximately $943,280 could be realized by training all call takers to triage and process fire/medical service calls, in addition to calls for police assistance.

Recommendations

The Mayor and the Board of Supervisors should:

1.12.1 Allocate funding required to replace uniformed members of the Fire Department with civilians to staff Fire/EMS Dispatch in a manner that facilitates the schedule proposed by the ECD.

The Emergency Communications Department should:

1.12.2 Recruit and train sufficient civilian trainees to staff the Fire/EMS Dispatch function in accordance with the planned schedule.

1.12.3 If feasible, train all Call Evaluators to process Fire/EMS calls for assistance.

1.12.4 Procure the Clawson medical dispatch system and place it into operation as soon as possible.

1.12.5 In conjunction with the Fire Department, ensure that CBD protocols are adhered to.

1.12.6 In conjunction with the Fire Department, develop a signed Interdepartmental Agreement concerning Fire/EMS Dispatch operations.

The Fire Department should:

1.12.7 In conjunction with the ECD, ensure that CBD protocols are adhered to.

1.12.8 Develop a Fire/EMS Dispatch operating procedure that covers such topics as departmental rules and regulations, personnel management, dispatch policies, and operational procedures.

1.12.9 In conjunction with the ECD, develop a signed Interdepartmental Agreement concerning Fire/EMS Dispatch operations.

The cost of replacing uniformed members of the Fire Department with civilian Call Evaluators/Dispatchers would require an initial outlay of approximately $2.3 million.

However, when fully implemented, approximately 48 Firefighters and 4 Paramedic Captains would be released for primary duties in their professions and annual savings of approximately $2 million would be realized because of the compensation differences between uniformed members and civilians. In addition, the Fire Department would save an undetermined amount on overtime, due to the increased availability of Firefighters and Paramedic Captains. Finally, by training all PSAP Call Evaluators to process Fire/EMS call for assistance, the ECD could save up to $943,280 in salaries and mandatory fringe benefits.

2.1 Operations Division Reorganization

To control emergency service operations on a 24-hour basis, the Fire Department has divided the City into three, geographically based divisions. Two divisions are assigned three battalions and the third division is assigned four battalions. Three Division Chiefs--and below the division level--10 Battalion Chiefs, command the Department"s 42 engines, 19 aerial trucks, 20 ambulances, two heavy rescue squads, the fire boat, and other emergency service units. Each Division Chief and each Battalion Chief is assigned a Chief"s Aide. In addition, the Chief of the Fire Department is assigned a Chief"s Aide on a 24-hour basis.

Based on a survey of other fire departments, a workload analysis of the San Francisco Fire Department, an analysis of the workloads that would result from reducing the number of suppression divisions and battalions, and a review of San Francisco Fire Department"s Incident Command System (ICS) Manual, the command structure should be reorganized to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Fire Department.

By adopting an alternative command structure that would include two divisions commanded by two regular workweek Division Chiefs, a single 24-hour shift Watch Commander, and six 24-hour shift Battalion Chiefs, the Department could operate more efficiently, effectively and economically, and potentially save over $4.2 million annually. The Fire Department should develop an analytical model based on statistical analysis of fire incidents, utilization rates for fire command staff and other factors which would better define division and battalion level staffing needs.

Recommendations

The Fire Commission should:

2.1.1 Conduct an analysis of the Department"s command structure, as discussed in this report.

Based on the analysis contained in this report, we believe the Chief of the Department should:

2.1.2 Consider reducing the number of Fire Suppression Divisions by one, from three to two, each commanded by a 40-hour workweek Division Commander.

2.1.3 Request adequate staff for each of the two Divisions to provide the planning, coordinating, directing, and controlling required to effectively deploy the Divisions.

2.1.4 Consider replacing the three 24-hour Division Chiefs with a single Watch Commander.

2.1.5 As a longer term operational objective, evaluate whether the assignment function could be performed more economically using suppression staff.

2.1.6 Delete one excess Battalion Chief Position.

2.1.7 Consider reducing the number of Fire Suppression Battalions from ten to six.

2.1.8 Place a high priority on correcting the shortcomings evidenced in the Fire Department"s responses to the questions listed in Attachment 2.1.1.

2.1.9 Evaluate its force structure in the light of its current mission so as to better align that structure with its current mission.

2.1.10 Transfer the Special Operations Section to the Deputy Chief of Operations.

The Department would incur approximately $2.1 million annually for additional staff recommended in this report. However, this would be offset by annual savings amounting to approximately $6.4 million, resulting in net annual savings of approximately $4.2 million. In addition, the Department would achieve more effective command and control of fire suppression operations.

2.2 Methodologies for Determining Staffing Requirements

The San Francisco Fire Department uses an automated staffing model to determine its minimum daily staffing requirement for the 354 fixed-post positions that must be filled on a daily basis. The model incorporates an overall relief factor that reflects employees" use of vacation, sick, disability, compensatory time off, military and other approved leave.

Our evaluation of the original model revealed the following : (a) it does not incorporate significant variables, such as the average number of employees scheduled for duty, and limited-duty assignments into its calculations for relief; and, (b) some of the variables used in the model overstated the Department"s historical use patterns.

By (a) including limited-duty assignments and all other leaves, (b) either using more accurate estimates of the number of employees scheduled for duty, or consistently applying alternative calculations, (c) estimating more realistic, time-sensitive leave averages, and (d) separately tracking leave usage for EMS and Dispatch personnel, the staffing model can become a more accurate instrument.

By implementing these recommendations, the Department would be provided with a more reliable basis for staff planning and projecting overtime cost driven by employee leave. Estimated budget savings from changes to the original model would total approximately $4,224,500 per year.

Recommendations

The San Francisco Fire Department should:

2.2.1 Continue use of the different automated staffing models to calculate the overall relief factor and FTEs required for all fixed-post positions in Suppression, Emergency Medical Services and the Radio Group;

2.2.2 Utilize all leave categories in calculating the relief factor.

2.2.3 Utilize historical data from the Daily Average Absence Report, based on averages covering the previous four year period.

2.2.4 Separately track and report on attendance and leave usage for personnel in Emergency Medical Services and in the Radio Group.

2.2.5 Prepare written procedures that describe construction and application of the models sufficient for other Finance staff to appropriately and correctly make use of them.

2.2.6 Work with staff in the Assignments Office and Human Resources Division to ensure accuracy of leave data captured in the Department"s automated system.

There would be no cost to implement these recommendations.

The Department would have a more reliable basis for staff planning budgeting, and would be able to more accurately project overtime costs. Budget savings from implementing the recommendations would be at least $4.2 million annually, based upon changes from the Department"s original budget model.

2.3 Convert Some Uniform Positions into Civilian Positions

The Fire Department"s use of uniform staff in administrative positions that do not require specific firefighter skills results in inefficient use of staff and increased costs to the Department from higher salaries and fringe benefits. The reasons provided by the Department for using uniform staff in positions that could be filled by civilian staff are often tangential to the job functions of the position. Generally, the Department is concerned that the process for hiring civilian staff is delayed and that civilian staff are more likely to leave the Department due to lack of promotional opportunities. The Department also uses uniform staff in administrative jobs, stating that uniform staff both bring special knowledge of the Department"s procedures to their jobs and need administrative experience for promotion to middle management. In the professional judgment of the Budget Analyst, such reasons are unjustified. We recommend that the Department determine whether positions are civilian or uniform based on the job duties of the position, and seek other methods for addressing personnel issues, promotional opportunities, and the need for knowledge of Department procedures in some administrative jobs. The Department should develop personnel policies and practices to improve civilian recruitment and retention, and use committees, workgroups and special projects to provide information and administrative experience for firefighters.

We also recommend that the Department convert specific uniform positions to civilian classifications in the Bureau of Equipment, Facilities Renovation, the 911 Project, Community Affairs, Bureau of Assignments, and Bureau of Fire Prevention. Assigning civilian staff to these positions would result in approximately $337,681 in cost savings to the Department from lower civilian salaries and fringe benefit rates, and from more efficient assignment of personnel. Table 2.3.1 below summarizes our recommendation for converting uniform positions to civilian positions and the cost savings from reduced salary and fringe benefit costs. As discussed above, the conversion of H-4 Inspector positions to 6281 Fire Inspector positions could be achieved through attrition. For the other positions, uniform staff filling the positions could be returned to field assignments. If, in some instances, the Department assigns the uniform incumbent to the civilian position, we recommend that the position be Y-rated. In addition to approximately $337,681 in cost savings from reduced salaries and fringe benefit costs, the Department will achieve cost savings by eliminating the $175 bi-weekly administrative pay differential of approximately $31,850 annually, and by reducing overtime by reassigning uniform staff to the field. Total Department savings to convert uniform positions to civilian would be approximately $369,531 annually.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

2.3.1 Convert the following uniform positions to civilian positions:

  • H-2 Firefighter in the Bureau of Equipment to 1952 Purchaser;
     
  • Seven H-2 Firefighters in the Bureau of Equipment to seven 7381 Automotive Mechanic,
     
  • H-30 Captain in Facilities Renovation to 7262 Maintenance Planner;
     
  • Five H-20 Lieutenants in Bureau of Assignments to five 1203 Personnel Technicians;
     
  • Twenty-four H-4 Inspectors in Bureau of Fire Inspection to twenty-four 6281 Inspectors;
     
  • H-18 Coordinator of Community Affairs to 1314 Public Relations Officer
     
  • H-20 Lieutenant in Neighborhood Emergency Response Training to 1314 Public Relations Officer

2.3.2 Convert the H-40 Battalion Chief in Bureau of Assignments to H-20 Lieutenant.

2.3.3 Classify all new Bureau of Equipment and MIS positions that are requested in the FY 2002-2003 budget as civilian positions.

Our recommendation to convert specific uniform positions to civilian positions would result in approximately $337,681 in cost savings to the Department from lower civilian salaries and fringe benefit rates. In addition, the Department will achieve cost savings by eliminating the $175 bi-weekly administrative pay differential of approximately $31,850 annually, and by reducing overtime by reassigning uniform staff to the field. Total cost savings to the Department would be $369,531 annually.

2.4 Watch Exchanges and Committee and Workgroup Meetings

The Department does not have adequate management controls over watch exchanges and workgroup and committee meetings, resulting in increased Department overtime liability and potential system abuse.

The Department is currently revising its policies regarding committees and workgroups. The Department plans to control time-coming and other committee costs by assigning to each committee or workgroup an Assistant Deputy Chief who would be accountable for costs. Committee and workgroup membership would be more clearly defined and committee and workgroup members would attend meetings during on-duty hours. The Department needs to set up a rigorous system for monitoring committee costs, including Department Chief approval of work group and committee work plans and the appropriate Deputy Chief approval of compensatory time prior to accrual. As part of the FY 2002-2003 budget review, the Department should evaluate and report the compensatory time costs for committees and workgroups, including Division of Training compensatory time and overtime expenditures for drill preparation and performance. Finally, the Department should meet and confer with its employee organizations to implement Rules and Regulations Section 418, to pay compensatory time for attending committee and workgroup meetings at the regular rate of pay and not at time-and-a-half.

To better monitor watch exchanges and to minimize potential abuse, the Department should pay firefighters for the hours actually worked when exchanging watches. By paying firefighters for the hours worked, the Department would have a payroll record of the shifts worked and not worked, thus minimizing abuses of the system. Firefighters exchanging watches would be eligible for overtime based on the actual number of hours worked in the pay period. If a firefighter works an exchanged watch for another firefighter, and if the second firefighter does not work the reverse exchange within the 21-day tour, then the firefighter working the exchanged watch would work more than 144 hours in a 21-day tour and would be eligible for overtime pay. The MOU between the San Francisco Fire Fighters Union, Local 798, and the City states that a firefighter may exchange a watch, "provided the exchange results in no net increase in cost to the City". Therefore, under our recommendation, the firefighter exchanging the watch would have to work the reverse exchange for the firefighter working the exchanged watch within the 21-day tour to avoid payment of overtime. Our recommendation would continue to permit firefighters to exchange watches, in accordance with the MOU, but would require the reverse exchange to be worked within the 21-day tour.. To increase flexibility, the Department should meet and confer with the Fire Fighters Union to increase the overtime limit for watch exchanges from the current MOU limit of 144 hours per 21-day tour to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) limit of 159 hours per 21-day tour. The City Charter provides that "officers and members may exchange watches with permission of the chief of department." According to the City Attorney"s Office this means that the Chief of Department has discretion in applying regulations and limits to watch exchanges and the recommendations of the Budget Analyst would not require any change in the City Charter.

Recommendations

The Department should:

2.4.1 Annually review its committees and workgroups and reduce or eliminate committees that do not perform a function or do not produce a work product consistent with the Department"s mission, and restructure or eliminate committees that have compensatory time or work product expenditures exceeding projected expenditures.

2.4.2 Develop written guidelines, outlining the reasons for committee members to attend meetings or perform committee work in off-duty status, require Department Chief approval of workgroup and committee work plans with members participating in off-duty status, and require the appropriate Deputy Chief approval for any additional committee and workgroup compensatory time and overtime expenditures prior to accrual.

2.4.3 Report compensatory time and overtime expenditures for committee and workgroups, including Division of Training compensatory time and overtime expenditures for drill preparation and performance, as part of the FY 2002-2003 budget review, including a written explanation of why the committee, workgroup, or drill preparation and performance could not be performed in on-duty status.

2.4.4 Meet and confer with the respective employee organizations to implement Rules and Regulations Section 418, to pay compensatory time for attending committee and workgroup meetings or conducting committee and workgroup work at the regular rate of pay and not at time-and-a-half.

2.4.5 Implement a payroll procedure to pay firefighters for exchanged watch hours actually worked and to deduct pay for firefighters exchanging the watch.

2.4.6 Meet and confer with the Fire Fighters Union to increase the overtime limit for watch exchanges from the current MOU limit of 96 hours per pay period to the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) limit of 159 hours per 21-day tour.

In FY 1998-1999, the Department incurred $576,691 in overtime costs for committee and workgroup meetings. Although the Department is currently revising its workgroup and committee policies to contain costs, the Department has not estimated the actual amount of cost-savings. However, the Department expects some continued compensatory time and overtime expenditures for workgroup and committee work, especially for planning and performing drills. Implementing more rigorous cost-containment measures and paying for committee and workgroup time at the regular rate of pay and not at time-and-a-half should result in a significant reduction in compensatory time costs.

3.1 Fees and Cost Recovery

The Bureau of Fire Prevention (BFP) charges fees for a variety of fire safety inspections and code violations. The BFP is allowed by law to recover its costs for providing such services but is not allowed to recover more than cost.

The BFP was unable to provide certain basic data regarding revenue collected from fees. Volume of activity data was based on estimates because it is not tracked through a management information system. The BFP also does not track the actual number of hours spent on given types of fire prevention services or, for fees based on valuation, the breakdown of service provided by valuation category.

The BFP"s methodology for determining its costs is not based on a standardized, consistent methodology and thus is likely to result in errors that misstate costs. As a result, the BFP"s fees may not be based on its actual costs.

If a lawsuit were filed alleging the BFP does not fully recover its costs (as has occurred in other California jurisdictions), the BFP would not currently have sufficient supporting documentation to defend itself and thus the City could potentially be found liable.

The BFP should adopt a cost allocation plan based on a standardized, consistent methodology. Such a methodology, as well as the fee-setting process, should be incorporated in a written Department procedure and its provisions should be well documented. Finance, rather than operational, personnel should apply the methodology to determine costs and establish appropriate fees. Lastly, the Department should develop appropriate tools for accurately tracking costs and revenues, through the accounting or other management information systems.

Better data on actual revenue collections and actual levels of activity will improve the Department"s ability to forecast collections. A more precise and better-documented cost allocation plan and fee-setting procedure would help BFP to determine and recover its actual costs.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should direct BFP to:

3.1.1 Improve its data collection processes with regard to (1) actual revenue collected, and (2) actual volume of activity by valuation category or by actual hours of service provided, depending on the fee. BFP should, at a minimum, attempt to collect revenue data and volume of activity data with existing technology.

3.1.2 Adopt a standardized cost allocation methodology that clearly identifies direct and indirect costs associated with providing fire prevention services and is consistent with cost accounting principles promulgated by State and Federal agencies with expertise in this area, such as the State Controller"s Office and the Federal Office of Management and Budget. The BFP should also improve the documentation of its cost allocation methodology and fee-setting methodology. Each category of the cost allocation plan should clearly identify which fire prevention services it covers. A clear explanation of how each fee was calculated should also be provided.

3.1.3 Direct the CFO to prepare the cost allocation plan and the fee rates, based on data provided by BFP operational personnel. The final work product should then be jointly reviewed by the CFO and BFP management.

3.1.4 Use actual productive hours, as opposed to total hours for which employees are paid, when determining hourly rates that form the basis for hourly fees.

3.1.5 Ensure that the hourly rates that form the basis for the fees are appropriately weighted to reflect time spent by given classifications of employees. Ensure that pre-and post-meeting time spent on inspections or meetings is accounted for in the fee setting.

3.1.6 Provide a written report annually to the Controller as specified in the San Francisco Fire Code. The BFP should review its costs, fees, and collections annually, as allowed by the Fire Code, and propose adjustments accordingly.

3.1.7 Review the categories of fire prevention service for which fees are not currently charged, and seek policy input from the Board of Supervisors to determine whether it might be appropriate and fiscally responsible to charge for some of the services which currently receive fee waivers.

There would be no cost to implement these recommendations.

The Fire Department would have a more accurate, legally defensible fee setting methodology, that would receive appropriate review and approvals, in accordance with the San Francisco Fire Code. Based on information collected for this analysis, the City could realize additional revenue to offset costs related to plan review, inspection and other fire prevention activities.

4.1 Restructure the EMS Division

The current scope of the EMS Division would be reduced by (a) relocating the EMS Special Operations Section as a direct report to the Deputy Chief of Operations, (b) transferring emergency medical services training and education functions to the new Division of Fire and Medical Training, and (c) eliminating the EMS Administration Section.

Once these structural adjustments have been implemented, the EMS Division would retain residual (a) policy development, implementation, and evaluation functions, and (b) operations management functions.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should:

4.1.1 Restructure the residual EMS Division as a smaller EMS Unit, eliminate the Classification H-43 EMS Operations Section Chief position, and create a new Classification 1824 Principal Administrative Analyst position.

4.1.2 Convene a working group in FY 2001-2002 through FY 2002-2003 to establish a completely integrated chain of command with appropriate emergency medical services oversight mechanisms by FY 2003-2004.

4.1.3 Once the integrated chain of command has been established, transfer emergency medical service policy development, implementation, and evaluation functions, and sufficient staffing resources, to the new Strategic Policy, Planning and Analysis Unit.

The elimination of the Classification H-43 EMS Operations Section Chief position would save $103,644 in salary costs and $28,052 in mandatory fringe benefit costs, for a total savings of $131,696. Offset against this would be $85,425 in salary costs and $23,558 in mandatory fringe benefit costs for the new Classification 1824 Principal Administrative Analyst position at the top step (total cost of $108,983). The total annual personnel savings would be $22,713.

4.2 EMS Service Configuration

The Department has incurred $2,471,851 in annual salary and fringe benefit costs for 36 new positions to staff four additional ambulances since FY 1999-2000. Since FY 1999-2000, although workload per ambulance has declined, workload continues to be unevenly distributed among ambulances and ambulance response times have not shown consistent improvement.

The Department has identified the need for more opportunities for firefighters to serve as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) on ambulances and for paramedics to work in suppression, and for better working conditions. Both the Basic Life Support (BLS) Ambulance Pilot Program and the proposed One and One Response Program (i.e., a program which splits paramedics between ambulances and fire engines to improve medical emergency response times) were designed to address these issues.Although the One and One Response Program does not increase the number of FTEs allocated for emergency medical services, the change in configuration of the FTEs would result in annual increased salary and fringe benefit costs of approximately $641,740.

The Department"s proposed One and One Response Program would deploy 19 Advanced Life Support (ALS) ambulances on a 24-hour basis, although the actual medical call volume varies greatly by the time of day. We recommend, when the Department implements the proposed One and One Response Program, that the Department deploy sixteen 24-hour ambulances. We recommend that the Department deploy 13 of the sixteen 24-hour ambulances as ALS ambulances and consider deploying three of the sixteen 24-hour ambulances as BLS ambulances. In addition, we recommend that the Department increase the number of 10-hour ambulances during times of peak medical call volume from approximately four ambulances under the Department"s proposed One and One Response Program to seven. Our recommendation would result in an annual cost savings of approximately $1,284,699 compared to the Department"s proposed One and One Response Program, and would distribute workload among ambulances more evenly. Our recommendation would also free-up 13 additional FTEs.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

4.2.1 Deploy sixteen 24-hour ambulances and seven 10-hour ambulances when implementing the One and One Response Program. We recommend that the Department deploy 13 of the sixteen 24-hour ambulances as ALS ambulances and that the Department consider deploying three of the sixteen 24-hour ambulances as BLS ambulances.

4.2.2 Meet and confer with the respective employee organizations to implement 10-hour shifts for covered employees assigned to 10-hour ambulances.

4.2.3 Submit quarterly reports to the Emergency Medical Services Agency (EMSA) and the Fire Commission, evaluating the performance of the One and One Response Program, including ALS response times, number of ambulance and engine dispatches compared to number of medical events, workload distribution by ambulance, and attrition of paramedic staff.

4.2.4 Submit an annual report to the Board of Supervisors, as part of the annual budget review, evaluating the costs and benefits of the One and One Response Program, including sick leave and overtime use, ALS response times, and number of dispatches compared to number of medical events.

The Department has incurred $2,471,851 in new annual salary and fringe benefit costs for creating 36 new positions and proposes to incur $641,740 in additional salary and fringe benefit costs for implementing the One and One Response Program. Our recommendation to deploy sixteen 24-hour ambulances and seven 10-hour ambulances would result in cost savings of approximately $1,284,699 when compared to the Department"s proposed implementation of the One and One Response Program.

4.3 Patient Data Collection Practices

EMS personnel collect patient medical and billing data on a Patient Care Report (PCR) at the scene of an EMS call. Such data becomes the basis for billing the patient for EMS services. PCRs with incomplete or inaccurate billing data are classified as non-billable.

In FY 2000-2001, $6,534,492 in accounts were identified as non-billables and classified as "Bad Address" or "Incomplete Address" based on incomplete or inaccurate billing information in the PCR.

The Fire Department should be able to collect additional revenue by encouraging EMS personnel to collect complete and accurate billing data on the PCR and by forming agreements with receiving hospitals with regard to patient billing data, as permissible by law.

The Fire Department should provide training for EMS personnel regarding the completion of PCRs as well as monitor the completion of PCRs and make the provision of complete, accurate billing data a key component of performance evaluation. The Fire Department should attempt to form agreements with receiving hospitals for the exchange of patient billing data.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

4.3.4 Work with AIS to monitor the completeness and accuracy of PCRs for billing purposes and have a supervisory Fire Department employee periodically sample and review incomplete PCRs. If patterns of EMS personnel who consistently do not collect accurate, complete data become evident, sanctions should be imposed and such personnel should be trained and coached. The Department should strive to make the collection of patient billing data a key part of employee performance.

4.3.4 Direct AIS to provide training on collecting accurate and complete patient billing data. Such training should focus on specific problem areas that AIS notes in its continuous reviews of PCRs.

4.3.3 Direct AIS to conduct on-site (at the Fire Department) research as soon as a PCR is identified as "Incomplete Address." Such research may aid in collecting more complete patient billing data and classifying fewer accounts as non-billable. Further, the Department"s contract with AIS should specify precisely the steps that AIS will take with regard to subsequently researching accounts that lack sufficient billing information. The contract should require that AIS document each research step it takes.

4.3.4 Negotiate agreements with hospitals receiving patients that stipulate that the hospitals will provide patient billing data to the Fire Department upon request as permissible by law.

The recommendations would require staff time and effort for research, training and negotiating but would not likely require any additional expenditure of funds. The recommendations could, however, provide significant benefits if the volume of non-billable accounts are reduced.

In FY 2000-2001, $6,534,492 in patient accounts were classified as non-billable due to incomplete or inaccurate billing information. We believe the above recommendations could aid in converting some of these accounts to billable accounts and therefore increase EMS revenues. By collecting five percent of the accounts currently classified as non-billable, an additional $326,725 would be collected annually. We believe such an increase is modest.

4.4 EMS Billings and Collections

The Fire Department contracts with a private company, Allied Information & Services Corp. (AIS), for billing and revenue collection related to EMS ambulance transport services. Billable accounts exceeding $300, which AIS is unable to collect, are currently transferred to the City"s Bureau of Delinquent Revenue (BDR) under the Treasurer/Tax Collector"s Office. BDR is a collection agency for the City with a variety of tools unavailable to AIS.

AIS classifies a significant number of accounts as "non-billable" due to insufficient or inaccurate billing information. In FY 2000-2001, 21,357 accounts totaling $9,713,265 were deemed non-billable. Such accounts represented 29.1% of the $33,336,522 in EMS service provided in FY 2000-2001.

Such accounts remain in AIS" system for three years and are accessible to employees in the same manner as active accounts. Though we found no evidence of any irregularity, the lack of internal controls to prevent employee access increases the risk of fraudulent collection.

The accounts that AIS currently transfers to BDR are not transferred in a timely manner. Further, the Fire Department is losing revenue because (1) non-billables are not transferred to BDR, (2) billable accounts that AIS is unable to collect are not transferred to BDR in a timely manner and (3) smaller billables are not transferred to BDR.

If transfers to BDR are made in a timely manner and expanded to include non-billables and smaller billables not currently transferred, the Fire Department should be able to collect additional revenue. A five-percent recovery of non-billables would result in $347,211 in additional net revenue for the Fire Department. If smaller, billable accounts totaling $922,224 are transferred to BDR and collected at the same rate as past billables that have been transferred, this should provide additional net revenue of $58,099. This would bring total additional net revenue to $405,310. Also, the more timely transfer of accounts would allow BDR to collect more on accounts that are currently transferred.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

4.4.1 Direct AIS to transfer non-billable accounts of more than $300 to BDR if they remain uncollected by AIS 90 days after the provision of EMS service.

4.4.2 Direct AIS to transfer non-billable accounts of $300 or less to BDR if they remain uncollected by AIS 90 days after the provision of EMS service. As noted previously, the City Attorney advises that the transfer of such accounts is allowable and BDR notes that it has accepted such accounts in the past from other departments.

4.4.3 Direct AIS to transfer billable accounts of more than $300, which are currently transferred to BDR, on a more timely basis. Such transfers should occur if such accounts remain uncollected by AIS 90 days after the first billing. Exceptions to the 90 day rule should be allowed for (1) accounts for which AIS anticipates payment from a third-party, but such payment has not yet been received; and, (2) accounts for which a third-party has denied the claim, whereby AIS should be allowed an additional 90 days to bill the patient for the balance.

4.4.4 Direct AIS to transfer billable accounts of $300 or less to BDR if such accounts remain uncollected by AIS 90 days after the first billing. The exceptions described in 4.4.3 should also apply to these accounts. As noted previously, the City Attorney advises that the transfer of such accounts is allowable and BDR notes that it has accepted such accounts in the past from other departments.

4.4.5 Enter into an ALS provider agreement with the local EMS agency, as required by the California Code of Regulations.

There would be no net cost to implement these recommendations.

These recommendations could increase revenue collections by $540,414 less $135,104 for a workorder for BDR to collect such additional revenue, resulting in net revenue of $405,310. Collections may be further increased by the more timely transfer of accounts to BDR from AIS.

4.5 Accounting Policies and Procedures

Collecting and accounting for EMS revenues involves several parties within and outside of the Fire Department, including AIS, a private vendor which contracts with the Department.

The Fire Department lacks written policies and procedures for: (1) accounting for EMS receivables and revenues (2) the write-off of uncollectible accounts and (3) the reconciliation of bank records with City accounting records and AIS records. As a result, the Department lacks sufficient monitoring and internal control mechanisms in these areas.

The clear delineation of responsibilities enhances the monitoring AIS billing services, as well as assures that actual revenues collected are consistent with accounting records. Such monitoring creates internal controls that reduce the risk of fraudulent collection of accounts and errors in the accounting records.

The lack of sufficient monitoring and internal controls results in the Department losing potential revenue due to undetected fraudulent collection of accounts or inaccurate accounting.

Recommendations

The Fire Chief should adopt written policies and procedures that:

4.5.1 Modify accounting procedures to ensure that both billable and non-billable EMS charges are reflected in the accounts receivable balance. This is consistent with fundamental principles of accounting with regard to recording accounts receivables and revenues. Establish written policies and procedures with regard to such accounting.

4.5.2 Modify accounting procedures to ensure that the revenue recognized is appropriately offset by an allowance account based on the amount the Department expects to collect. This is consistent with fundamental principles of accounting with regard to recording accounts receivables and revenues. Establish written policies and procedures with regard to such accounting.

4.5.3 Ensure that the appropriate segregation of duties exist between staff who make entries in the accounting records.

4.5.4 Ensure that the Department receives daily deposit summaries directly from the bank.

4.5.5 Establish criteria for the classifying accounts as uncollectible and provide for periodic audits of such accounts by the Department.

4.5.6 Conduct monthly reconciliation of accounting records, AIS" records, and bank records to detect and address inconsistencies in a timely manner. Establish written policies and procedures with regard to such reconciliations.

There would be no cost to implement these recommendations. Implementation would enhance internal control and reduce the risk of inaccurate accounting or fraudulent collection of accounts.

4.6 EMS Inventory Controls

The Bureau of Equipment (BOE) Procurement/Distribution Center procures and distributes an inventory of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals (excluding controlled substances) to fire stations for use by EMS personnel. BOE is responsible for purchasing, managing, and accounting for approximately $1,200,000 annually in such inventory.

At the fire stations, such supplies are stored in unlocked lockers and are not tracked when they are removed. There is a risk of loss due to theft or misuse because medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are not tracked as they are removed from the lockers. While we have no evidence such losses have occurred, the existing internal controls are inadequate to prevent such losses.

The Department should lock the lockers and implement sign-out sheets to be completed by EMS personnel when they remove supplies from the lockers. BOE should also use its proposed inventory management system to identify irregularities in the use of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals by fire stations.

Increased monitoring of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals would improve internal controls and therefore reduce the risk of loss due to theft or misuse.

Recommendations

The Fire Department should:

4.6.1 Lock supply lockers that contain medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. Keys should always be available in case supplies are needed. However, they should be accessible only through fire station management, or a representative designated by management.

4.6.2 Implement sign-out sheets, similar to those used by the Department for controlled substances, for the removal of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals from the fire station supply lockers. Such sign-out sheets should require two signatures for the removal of supplies and should provide sufficient detail with regard to the unit and crew removing the inventory.

4.6.3 Begin monitoring the usage of medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, through the recommended sign-out sheets and through the pending computerized inventory management system. Irregularities should be reported to management and appropriately researched and addressed.

There would be no cost to implement these recommendations.

The Bureau of Equipment manages approximately $1,200,000 annually in inventory. The risk of loss due to theft or misuse would be decreased by strengthening internal controls.

Respectfully submitted,

Harvey M. Rose
Budget Analyst

cc: Supervisor Maxwell
President Ammiano
Supervisor Daly
Supervisor Gonzalez
Supervisor Hall
Supervisor Leno
Supervisor McGoldrick
Supervisor Newsom
Supervisor Sandoval
Supervisor Yee
Mayor Brown
Clerk of the Board
Controller
Ben Rosenfield
Ted Lakey
Mario H. Treviño
Dr. John Brown
Dr. Mitchell Katz

 

Attachment 1

Attachment 1

1 All of the currently appropriated safety funds are for equipment rather than a programmatic approach as recommended. Only a portion of those funds would be reallocated for this new program. It is further assumed that one or more of the positions targeted for elimination in a separate recommendation could be moved to staff this new program.